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1

tary data retention scheme.

INTRODUCTION
2

Many people love Google, but nobody roots for Goliath.
Google’s gains made Goliath a target for jawboning. In
2014, Google was experiencing newfound success in its nascent
efforts in American politics. The company’s support for network
neutrality aligned it with other tech firms, helping influence
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to adopt open
3
Internet rules. It headed off an antitrust investigation into the
4
company’s algorithm for ranking its search results. Perhaps
most importantly, in 2011–2012, Google helped lead the fight to
defeat a pair of federal bills favored by content providers, the
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and PROTECT IP Act, that

† Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of
Law. I owe thanks for helpful suggestions and discussion to Jack Balkin, Jane
Bambauer, Ian Bartrum, Andy Coan, Aliza Cover, Sarah Haan, Dan Hunter,
Margaret Kwoka, Saul Levmore, Fred von Lohmann, Dave Marcus, Michael
Montgomery Mason, Toni Massaro, Thinh Nguyen, Carolina Nuñez, Michael
Risch, Shaakirrah Sanders, Michalyn Steele, Peter Swire, Alan Trammell, the
participants at the Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference at Yale Law
School, and the participants at the Rocky Mountain Junior Scholars Forum
2014. Thanks go to Maureen Garmon for expert research assistance. I welcome comments at <derekbambauer@email.arizona.edu>. Copyright © 2015 by
Derek E. Bambauer.
1. See Declan McCullagh, DOJ Pressed for Details on Internet Tracking
Plan, CNET NEWS (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.cnet.com/news/doj-pressed-for
-details-on-internet-tracking-plan.
2. Wilt Chamberlain, the legendary National Basketball Association
player, complained that “Nobody roots for Goliath.” Larry Schwartz, Wilt Battled “Loser” Label, ESPN, https://espn.go.com/sportscentury/features/
00014133.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2015).
3. See Bill Chappell, FCC Approves Net Neutrality Rules for “Open Internet,” NPR (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2015/02/26/
389259382/net-neutrality-up-for-vote-today-by-fcc-board; Brian Fung, Google,
Netflix Lead Nearly 150 Tech Companies in Protest of FCC Net Neutrality
Plan, WASH. POST (May 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2014/05/07/google-netflix-lead-nearly-150-tech-companies-inprotest-of-fcc-net-neutrality-plan; Brian Fung, Google’s Studied Silence on Net
Neutrality Has Finally Broken, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/09/10/googles-studied-silence
-on-net-neutrality-has-finally-broken; Tom Wheeler, FCC Chairman Tom
Wheeler: This Is How We Will Ensure Net Neutrality, WIRED (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://www.wired.com/2015/02/fcc-chairman-wheeler-net-neutrality.
4. See Craig Timberg, FTC: Google Did Not Break Antitrust Law with
Search Practices, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/technology/ftc-to-announce-google-settlement-today/2013/01/03/
ecb599f0-55c6-11e2-bf3e-76c0a789346f_story.html.

2015]

AGAINST JAWBONING

53

threatened Internet firms with liability if they failed to under5
take new copyright enforcement measures.
In the struggle between Hollywood and Silicon Valley,
6
Google won. Along with the Obama Administration and an ad
hoc coalition of Internet users and interest groups, the firm
7
forced the abandonment of the bills. Internet firms had dis8
played a new seriousness about flexing political muscle, and
Hollywood, accustomed to having its way with intellectual
9
property policy, reeled in defeat.
But SOPA was not dead—merely driven underground.
Content companies quietly regrouped. Rebuffed at the federal
level, the firms, led by the movie studios’ lobbying arm, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), turned their attention to state regulators. In particular, the MPAA sought assistance from state attorneys general. Hollywood succeeded: by
November 2013, the National Association of Attorneys General
was holding a special meeting about pressuring Google to deal
with copyright infringement—a meeting attended by the
MPAA’s outside counsel Thomas Perrelli, of the prominent law
10
firm Jenner & Block. In December 2013, Connecticut’s Attor5. See PROTECT IP Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011), http://www
.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BillText-PROTECTIPAct.pdf; Stop Online
Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th
-congress/house-bill/3261/text; Mark Lemley et al., Don’t Break the Internet, 64
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34, 34 (2011); Dan Mitchell, The Secret Behind the
SOPA Defeat, FORTUNE (Jan. 31, 2012), http://fortune.com/2012/01/31/the
-secret-behind-the-sopa-defeat.
6. See Michael Crowley, Washington SOPA Opera: Lobbying Power
Shifts from Hollywood to Silicon Valley, TIME (Jan. 20, 2012), http://
swampland.time.com/2012/01/20/washington-sopa-opera-lobbying-power-shifts
-from-hollywood-to-silicon-valley.
7. See Victoria Espinel et al., Combating Online Piracy While Protecting
an Open and Innovative Internet, WE THE PEOPLE (Jan. 13, 2012), https://
petitions.whitehouse.gov/response/combating-online-piracy-while-protecting
-open-and-innovative-internet; Mitchell, supra note 5.
8. See Crowley, supra note 6; Jennifer Martinez et al., SOPA’s Surprise
Hollywood Ending, POLITICO (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.politico.com/story/
2012/01/sopas-surprise-hollywood-ending-071746; Mitchell, supra note 5.
9. See Crowley, supra note 6; Pamela McClintock, MPAA Chief Christopher Dodd Says SOPA Debate Isn’t over, Defends Hosting Harvey Weinstein
Even as He Attacked over “Bully,” HOLLYWOOD REP. (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www
.hollywoodreporter.com/news/mpaa-christopher-dodd-sopa-bully-harvey
-weinstein-ratings-308359.
10. See Russell Brandom, Project Goliath: Inside Hollywood’s Secret War
Against Google, VERGE (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.theverge.com/2014/12/12/
7382287/project-goliath; Joe Mullin, Hollywood v. Goliath: Inside the Aggressive Studio Effort To Bring Google To Heel, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 19, 2014),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/12/how-hollywood-spurned-by
-congress-pressures-states-to-attack-google.
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ney General contacted the MPAA for a list of things to demand
11
in a meeting with the search engine’s executives. And in January 2014, thirteen state attorneys general met with Google
General Counsel Kent Walker regarding search results that list
12
infringing content.
The MPAA found two especially willing collaborators in
Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood and Nebraska Attorney
General Jon Bruning. Before the January 2014 meeting,
Perrelli noted in an e-mail that Hood “wants Google to delist
13
pirate sites.” And in February 2014, Bruning—to whom both
the MPAA and movie studios made campaign donations the fol14
lowing month —discussed using civil subpoenas, lawsuits, and
15
media outreach “to alert consumers to Google’s ‘bad acts.’”
Shortly thereafter, Perrelli described plans to have his firm
draft civil subpoenas that Bruning and Hood could use, and
suggested that “[s]ome subset of AGs (3–5, but Hood alone if
necessary) should move toward issuing CIDs [Civil Investiga16
tive Demands] before mid-May.” Here, for the first time, the
17
MPAA assigned Google its code name: Goliath. Later that
year, Jenner & Block drafted, and Hood signed, a subpoena to
Google about videos promoting steroid and other drug use, depicting pornography, and infringing copyright. In December
2014, Google filed suit in federal court in Mississippi to block
18
Hood’s investigation, as e-mail messages and other documents
from Project Goliath were brought to light by the hack of Sony
19
Pictures’ computer systems.
This Article focuses not on the problems with Hood’s subpoena, but with the events that led up to it. Once Hood followed
through on his threats with formal legal process, Google could
11. See Mullin, supra note 10.
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. See Nick Wingfield & Eric Lipton, Google’s Detractors Take Their
Fight to the States, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
12/17/technology/googles-critics-enlist-state-attorneys-general-in-their-fight
.html?ref=technology&_r=0.
15. Mullin, supra note 10 (quoting Bruning).
16. Id. (quoting Perrelli e-mail).
17. See id.; Brandom, supra note 10 (quoting Perrelli e-mail).
18. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Google Inc.’s Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Google Inc. v.
Hood, No. 3:14-cv-981-HTW-LRA (N.D. Miss. Dec. 19, 2014) [hereinafter
Memorandum of Law].
19. See Brandom, supra note 10; Andrea Peterson, The Sony Pictures
Hack, Explained, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/12/18/the-sony-pictures-hack-explained.
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20

challenge it in court (successfully, as it turns out). Prior to
that, Hood and the other attorneys general were jawboning the
search engine—they sought to coerce the company based on
threatened action at the edges of or wholly outside their legal
authority. The difficulty with the efforts by Hood and his counterparts is not simply the motivation; state officials advocate
for interest groups constantly. The issue is that Hood threatened Google despite lacking authority over the subject matter
of his investigation. Regulation of drugs such as steroids and
21
their advertising is governed by federal law, and states may
enforce those provisions in only a small number of circum22
stances. Under the Communications Decency Act (CDA),
Google enjoys immunity from state criminal prosecution or civil
liability based on third-party content, such as the drug adver23
tising or pornography to which Hood objected. In addition,
24
Google enjoys immunity from copyright liability for hosting,
25
26
caching, or linking to infringing material, so long as it takes
a statutorily-prescribed set of precautions. From a legal perspective, Hood’s threats were bluffs: he did not have the power
to compel Google to adhere to his demands.
So why would Hood or other attorneys general bluff, and
why might Google obey? There are two reasons: cost and uncertainty. As to cost, even a subpoena that was ultra vires—
beyond the official’s power—would cause Google to incur poten-

20. See Memorandum of Law, supra note 18; Russell Brandom, Google
Gets an Early Win in Fight Against Mississippi Attorney General’s Subpoena,
VERGE (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.theverge.com/2015/3/2/8135205/google-jim
-hood-goliath-subpoena-case-injunction (describing preliminary injunction
barring Hood’s investigation).
21. See 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2006).
22. See 21 U.S.C. § 337(b) (allowing states to bring claims for mislabeling). The Food and Drug Administration contends that pre-emption of state
drug advertising regulation is complete and unequivocal. Requirements on
Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological
Products, 71 FED. REG. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (“FDA believes that under
existing preemption principles, FDA approval of labeling under the
act . . . preempts conflicting or contrary State law.”).
23. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (“No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”); 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(e)(3) (“No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”);
Backpage.com v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 822 (M.D. Tenn. 2013);
GoDaddy.com v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 758 (Tex. App. 2014).
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012).
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(b).
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
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27

tially significant expense. Lawyers at WilmerHale—Google’s
outside counsel—do not come cheap, and if Hood defeated the
motion for the temporary restraining order, Google would have
28
had to comply with burdensome discovery. And the potential
costs were more than pecuniary—the MPAA planned to allocate budget to media outreach efforts designed to harm
29
Google’s reputation. Even false accusations can wound.
And, the outcome was not certain: courts differ on statutory interpretation, and can make mistakes. For example, appellate courts interpret the scope of immunity under the CDA dif30
ferently. Contrary to federal and state rules of civil procedure,
judges not infrequently seek to bind Google to decisions where
31
it is not a party. Jawboning transfers much of the risk of enforcement to the target. Enforcement may be a lottery ticket for
the regulator threatening action, but the potential windfall
32
may be enough to shape the regulated party’s conduct. Thus,
27. See Nathan A. Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV.
1503, 1522 (2013) (discussing cost deterrence).
28. See Memorandum of Law, supra note 18, at 33, 36 (describing subpoena as “unreasonable, retaliatory, and burdensome” and listing Google’s counsel from WilmerHale).
29. See Mullin, supra note 10 (quoting e-mail from MPAA counsel
Fabrizio discussing budget to be spent on “seed media stories based on investigation and AG actions”).
30. Compare Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1118–19
(9th Cir. 2007) (immunizing payment provider and Web host against claimed
infringements of state rights of publicity based on 47 U.S.C. § 230), with Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc. 478 F.3d 413, 442–43 (1st Cir. 2007)
(stating that a claim under state-based trademark law would not be subject to
Section 230 immunity).
31. See Memorandum and Order, Arista Records v. Vita Tkach, No. 1:15cv-03701 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2015), http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/public/
destop/document/Arista_Records_LLC_et_al_v_Vita_Tkach_et_al_Docket_No_
115cv03701_/3 (holding domain name service provider subject to injunction
against online file sharing service Grooveshark because Court concluded provider was in active concert with Grooveshark); Order Denying on Reconsideration Plaintiffs’ Motion to Hold Public Interest Registry in Contempt of this
Court’s December 2, 2010, and December 20, 2010, Orders, North Face Apparel Corp. v. Fujian Sharing Imp. & Exp. Ltd., No. 1:10-cv-01630-AKH (S.D.N.Y.
June 24, 2011), http://www.scribd.com/doc/58810497/North-Face-v-Fujian
-Sharing-10-CV-1630-S-D-N-Y-6-24-11 (holding non-party domain name registrar could be bound by injunction against counterfeiting defendant because
registrar aided and abetted defendant by resolving its domain names); Eric
Goldman, A New Way To Bypass 47 USC 230? Default Injunctions and FRCP
65, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Nov. 10, 2009), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2009/11/a_new_way_to_by.htm. But see Blockowicz v. Williams, 630
F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2010) (confirming non-party Web host could not be
compelled to remove material). I thank Fred von Lohmann for referring me to
the North Face case.
32. Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 91–92 (Yale Univ.,
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uncertainty creates expected cost for the target in addition to
the transaction costs described above. Jawboning can be effective even when operating at the limits of a government official’s
powers.
The term “jawboning” is Biblical in origin: Samson killed a
thousand men using a seemingly weak tool—a donkey’s jaw33
bone. Legal scholarship borrowed the concept first to denote
34
35
informal pressures by Presidents and agency heads on recalcitrant bureaucracies, and more recently to stand for suasion
36
through informal contacts by regulators generally, including
37
members of Congress. This Article employs the term to connote a specific type of informal pressure by a government actor
on a private entity: one that operates at the limit of, or outside,
38
that actor’s authority. This Article then assesses jawboning in
one particular context—regulation of Internet intermediaries
and the information they disseminate. The Internet provides a
useful context for studying jawboning, because the larger libertarian trend in regulation of the Net leads would-be regulators
39
to employ informal rather than formal means. This Article argues that like Samson, state regulators wielding seemingly ineffectual weapons—informal enforcement based on murky au1970) (describing how uncertainty in accident incidence impedes optimal allocation of costs).
33. Judges 15:15 (New Am. Ed.) (“Near him was the fresh jawbone of an
ass; he reached out, grasped it, and with it killed a thousand men.”).
34. See Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte
Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 943 (1980).
35. See Symposium, The Legacy of Justice Arthur Goldberg, 29 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 285, 301 (2012) (describing Goldberg’s
“suggest[ion] that the [Kennedy] administration implement ‘wage and price’
guidelines based on what’s called jawboning”).
36. See Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the Lackluster First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 727, 753–54 (2010); L.A. Powe, Jr., Red Lion
and Pacifica: Are They Relics?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 445, 461–62 (2009); David
Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187, 209–10 (2010).
37. See Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the
Separation of Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1233 (2014).
38. See infra Part II. Firms may also engage in self-regulation in the face
of impending governmental regulation, as when the National Advertising Division of the Council of Better Business Bureaus created the Children’s Advertising Review Unit (CARU) in 1974 to forestall a Federal Trade Commission
proposal to limit ads directed at children. Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation
and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711, 735–36 (1999). I thank Peter Swire
for this example.
39. See Annemarie Bridy, Internet Payment Blockades, FLA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=24940 19.
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thority—appear outgunned; yet like Samson, they achieve surprisingly-effective results once the contest begins.
This approach places the Article at the intersection of three
contentious scholarly debates. The first focuses on how government ought to respond to disfavored speech—whether via
40
41
targeted counterspeech, tolerant pluralism, promotion of re42
sponsibility as a means towards self-government, or legal pro43
hibition. The second probes the limits of government’s author44
ity to regulate expression and whether some disfavored
content may be subject to controls because it is not “speech”
45
under the First Amendment. This debate has recently become
bound up in Internet-related questions, such as those about
46
47
search engines, algorithmically-generated information, and
48
the role of technology in authorship. Some scholars defend informal enforcement as more efficient and cost-effective, desirable for industries undergoing dynamic change, and more readi40. See COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT
SHOULD IT SAY? 80–104 (Princeton Univ. Press, 2012). But see Frank I.
Michelman, Legitimacy and Autonomy: Values of the Speaking State, 79
BROOK. L. REV. 985, 985–1004 (2014); Robin West, Liberty, Equality, and
State Responsibilities, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1031, 1031–45 (2014).
41. See John D. Inazu, A Confident Pluralism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 587
(2015).
42. See JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY 38–
39, 115–24 (Harv. Univ. Press, 2013). But see Robin West, Sovereign Citizens
and Civic Responsibility, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 1, 2013), http://
concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/03/sovereign-citizens-and-civic
-responsibility.html.
43. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 142
(Harv. Univ. Press, 2014); Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD.
L. REV. 655, 657 (2012).
44. See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 58
(2014).
45. See id. at 62. See generally Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and
Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries,
104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 117–24 (2010); Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards,
Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1652
(2009).
46. See generally Oren Bracha, The Folklore of Informationalism: The
Case of Search Engine Speech, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629 (2014); James
Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868 (2014); Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1496–98 (2013).
47. See generally Derek E. Bambauer, Copyright = Speech, 65 EMORY L.J.
(forthcoming 2015); Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the
Artificially Intelligent Author, 5 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2012).
48. Compare Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025, 2070–
78 (2014) (arguing that copyright law should evolve to recognize multiple authors), with Rebecca Tushnet, How Many Wrongs Make a Copyright?, 98
MINN. L. REV. 2346, 2348 (2014) (disagreeing with the argument that the definition of authorship should change).
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49

ly adapted to new circumstances than formal measures. But
they are the minority. Most scholars decry informal enforce50
51
ment, calling it an approach that is unfair, contrary to no52
tions of limited government, and likely to impose unduly on53
erous regulatory burdens.
This Article brings these debates into fruitful dialogue with
one another and injects useful notes into each of them. For the
first debate, it aligns government responses along a continuum
of coercion, arguing that more coercive responses must be
channeled into formal legal mechanisms to obtain legitimacy.
For the second, it elucidates the problems with informal enforcement of policies about expression, which readily evades
constitutional and statutory constraint. And for the third, it assesses informal pressures in a provocative contextthe regulation of speech on Internet platformsto suggest that legitimacy
varies not with industry or cost, but with deeper structural
commitments to constraining government.
This Article contends that, regardless of whether jawboning is suspect generally, it is pernicious when applied to Internet intermediaries regarding the content that they provide. Internet platforms such as Google, Twitter, Facebook, and

49. See Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
1705, 1720–22 (2007) (arguing that the fear that informal agency rulemaking
avoids scrutiny is unfounded, because informal rules are subject to serious judicial scrutiny ex post); Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons
from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 626 (2008) (contending that
informal enforcement is “not a second-best, but is simply an alternative regulatory instrument that has advantages that formal legislation lacks”); Tim
Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1848 (2011) (arguing that informal
enforcement is well-suited to dynamically changing industries); David Zaring,
Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 298 (2006) (arguing that “best practices”
rulemaking, by which an agency leads not by hard rules but by example, can
be efficient and effective).
50. See Jerry Brito, “Agency Threats” and the Rule of Law: An Offer You
Can’t Refuse, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 553, 554 (2014); Brent Skorup & Adam Thierer, Uncreative Destruction: The Misguided War on Vertical Integration in the Information Economy, 65 FED. COMM. L.J. 157, 196–97 (2013); see
also Wu, supra note 49 (admitting that “[t]he scholarly presumption is that
rulemaking or formal adjudication is an intrinsically superior process for most
agency action.”).
51. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1396 (1992).
52. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements,
Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them To
Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1312 (1992).
53. See Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 875 (1997).
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Instagram are the new gatekeepers for online content. Indeed,
the story of the modern commercial Internet is largely one
55
about intermediaries. Material de-listed from Google’s search
results or deleted from a Twitter feed simply disappears for
56
practical purposes. Jawboning that targets platforms over information they carry is normatively illegitimate for three principal reasons. First, platforms are structurally vulnerable to informal pressures. They lack robust incentives to protect third57
party content and instead are likely to cave under pressure.
Second, the First Amendment institutionalizes a strong preference, if not a command, for government actors to channel regulatory demands via formal mechanisms rather than informal
58
ones. This is because speech is at once strong and weak:
strong in its power to change minds and policies and weak because it is readily suppressed, even in the low-cost ecosystem of
59
the Internet. Information online is an attractive target and
one that may be poorly defended. Lastly, from the perspective
of a process-based approach to decisions about content, jawboning is less legitimate than actions taken through formal chan54. I use “intermediary” and “platform” interchangeably, for the sake of
variety. I define the terms as denoting Internet entities that enable communication by others. This is similar to how experts such as Marc Andreessen define it, but my view of “programmability” is broader: protocols such as SMTP
and TCP/IP are APIs in that they enable programmatic interaction, so entities
such as Internet Service Providers would fall within my definition of “platform.” See Marc Andreessen, The Three Kinds of Platforms You Meet on the
Internet, PMARCA BLOG (Sept. 16, 2007), http://blog.pmarca.com/2007/09/the
-three-kinds.html. But see Tarleton L. Gillespie, The Politics of Platforms, 12
NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 347, 348 (2010) (discussing “the discursive work that
prominent digital intermediaries, especially YouTube, are undertaking, by focusing on one particular term: ‘platform’”).
55. See Derek E. Bambauer, Middlemen, 64 FLA. L. REV. F. 64, 64 (2013)
(discussing the dominant role of Internet intermediaries). See generally Douglas Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable,
14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221 (2006); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Law of the Intermediated Information Exchange, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1337 (2012); Ronald J. Mann &
Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 239 (2005).
56. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Delete Squad, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 29, 2013),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113045/free-speech-internet-silicon-valley
-making-rules.
57. See Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
11, 28–32 (2006).
58. See Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863,
899–905 (2012) [hereinafter Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair]; Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA. L. REV.
479, 489, 492–504 (2012).
59. See Hamburger, supra note 58, at 492–93; Kreimer, supra note 57.
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nels, which are more likely to be transparent and accountable.
This Article has three more Parts. Part I describes the rise
of jawboning as a concept and offers a series of case studies,
showing that American government actors increasingly deploy
the practice. Part II evaluates the legitimacy of jawboning, and
concludes that the tactic is normatively inferior to formal
modes of state action. Part III considers possible responses to
the increase of illegitimate informal enforcement. This Article
concludes by exploring how the jawboning analysis can be applied beyond Internet speech and how it can offer guidance in
new regulatory contexts.
I. THE RISE OF JAWBONING
This Part argues that jawboningenforcement through informal channels, where the underlying authority is in doubtis
on the rise, driven by a libertarian trend in Internet regulation
that constrains more formal actions. It then offers four additional, recent case studiesBackpage, data retention, Six
Strikes, and network neutralityas evidence of the increasingly widespread deployment of jawboning.
A. THE NET’S LIBERTARIAN TREND
The rise in jawboning is a counterpoint to, and partly a
consequence of, the deregulatory trend regarding online platforms and their content. This libertarian evolution appears
puzzling, for there is a wide range of Internet material that is
routinely decried: private information about individuals’ fi60
61
62
nances, sex habits, or buying patterns ; pornography and
63
64
other indecent material; hate speech; copyright infringe60. See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 23–24); Paul Ziobro & Danny Yardon, Target
Now Says 70 Million People Hit in Data Breach, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023037544045793122325463924
64.
61. See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 (2014); Ryan Singel, Security
Researcher Wants Lube Maker Fined for Privacy Slip, WIRED (July 10, 2007),
http://www.wired.com/2007/07/security-resear.
62. See, e.g., David Lazarus, Verizon’s Super-Cookies Are a Super Privacy
Violation, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi
-lazarus-20150203-column.html.
63. See generally Cheryl B. Preston, Making Family-Friendly Internet a
Reality: The Internet Community Ports Act, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1471 (2007).
64. See Danielle Keats Citron, Civil Rights in Our Information Age, in
THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET 31 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds.,
2010); Alexander Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech on the
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66

ment; pro-drug use information; content encouraging eating
67
68
disorders; information advocating suicide; ads for prostitu69
tion; and so forth. Each issue has groups that press strongly
for greater controls over information, particularly controls that
target platforms.
Yet, in the United States, the trend is clearly towards forbearance rather than oversight. The history of attempted regulation is one of frequent failure. The Supreme Court struck
down two federal statutes seeking to safeguard minors from in70
decent online material on constitutional grounds, and lower
federal courts followed their example by invalidating similar
71
state laws. Two proposed bills that would have counteracted
sites that enable intellectual property infringement by cutting
off their financial support, forcing their removal of search results, and blocking domain name services faltered in the wake
72
of popular discontent and tech industry opposition. Data retention proposals, a hardy Congressional perennial, have failed
73
to make any significant progress. And the long-running law
enforcement effort to limit encryption of material has been
74
stymied to date.
Internet, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817 (2001).
65. See, e.g., McClintock, supra note 9.
66. See Douglas A. Berman, Previewing the Advocacy Battle in Florida
over 2014 Medical Marijuana Initiative, MARIJUANA L. POL’Y & REFORM
(Aug. 18, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/marijuana_law/2014/08/
previewing-the-advocacy-battle-in-florida-over-2014-medical-marijuana
-initiative.html; Elizabeth Nolan Brown, State Attorneys General to Google:
Censor or Be Censored, REASON (Apr. 17, 2014), http://reason.com/blog/2014/
04/17/google-censored-state-attorneys-general.
67. See, e.g., Mark L. Norris et al., Ana and the Internet: A Review of ProAnorexia Websites, 39 INT’L J. EATING DISORDERS 443 (2006); Jennifer Van
Pelt, Eating Disorders on the Web—The Pro-Ana/Pro-Mia Movement, 9 SOC.
WORK TODAY 20 (Sept./Oct. 2009), http://www.socialworktoday.com/archive/
092109p20.shtml.
68. See Lucy Biddle et al., Suicide and the Internet, 336 BMJ 800 (2008).
69. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Where Pimps Peddle Their Goods, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 2012, at SR1.
70. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 586 (2002) (enjoining governmental enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act); Reno v.
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 882 (1997) (holding that sections
223(a) and 223(d) of the Communications Decency Act abridge the First
Amendment’s free speech protection).
71. See Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, supra note 58, at 878–79.
72. See supra note 5.
73. See infra Part I.C.
74. See Herb Lin, Echoes from the Past on Encryption, LAWFARE
(Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2015/02/echoes-from-the-past-on
-encryption (noting that despite two decades of debate, the government has
taken no steps to limit encryption).
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In addition to content control efforts that have failed in
Congress or the courts, successful legislation and doctrinal developments have tended to protect platforms against liability.
Section 230 of the CDA immunizes interactive computer ser75
vices against most state tort and criminal law. Title II of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) provides a safe harbor from copyright liability for service providers who imple76
ment a fairly minimal set of precautionary measures. Similarly, pre-DMCA copyright precedent tended to impose liability
only where platforms had specific knowledge of infringing material on their systems, or where they controlled and monetized
77
that content. Fair use and contract precedent has also been
generous to platforms, to the point of rewriting offline case law
78
to accommodate search engines and other intermediaries. In
trademark law, circuit courts have immunized platforms such
79
as eBay so long as they follow DMCA-like precautions, and a
seminal secondary liability case declined to fault a registrar
80
that registered domain names it knew were infringing. In patent, the Supreme Court interpreted inducement of infringement to exempt a party that performed all but one step of a
method patent, even where that party arguably encouraged its
81
customers to take the final step. Tort claims against platforms
75. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
76. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
77. See, e.g., CoStar Grp. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 556 (4th Cir.
2004) (holding provider not liable for infringing material because it had no
knowledge or control of that material); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373–77 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that
provider could not contribute to infringement without knowledge of or participation in the infringement, and dismissing theory of provider’s “vicarious liability”).
78. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 318–19 (9th Cir. 2003);
Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115–16 (D. Nev. 2006). In Field,
the court found that the plaintiff-author had granted Google an implied license by dint of his failure to use HTML tags to indicate he did not want the
search engine to catalog his site. Standard copyright doctrine is that one must
affirmatively obtain a license from the copyright owner, rather than the owner
needing to signal that there is no such permission. See id.
79. See Tiffany v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that
eBay’s generalized knowledge of trademark infringement on its site was not
sufficient to hold it liable for that infringement).
80. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 980
(9th Cir. 1999).
81. See Limelight Networks v. Akamai Tech., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2115
(2014). See generally Michael A. Carrier, Limelight v. Akamai: Limiting Induced Infringement, WISC. L. REV. ONLINE (2014), http://wisconsinlawreview
.org/wp-content/files/Carrier-WLR-Online-Final.pdf (discussing how Limelight
weakened infringement doctrine).
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that suffer data breaches have failed for a variety of doctrinal
82
reasons. First Amendment safeguards prevent plaintiffs from
holding search engines responsible for the content or ordering
83
of their results. Finally, even where platforms are liable for
third-party material, such as child pornography, they are held
to account only when the firms have actual knowledge of an
84
apparent violation.
There are exceptions, of course, particularly where the content is of the platform’s creation. Firms could be liable for cre85
ating or knowingly distributing obscene material or child por86
nography. Despite Section 230 of the CDA’s protections,
platforms are liable in some circuits for violating a person’s
87
right of publicity, and in all circuits if the tortious material is
88
of the firm’s creation. They can be sanctioned if they obtain in89
formation from their users in violation of the Wiretap Act or
90
the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, or if they dis91
close it in violation of the Stored Communications Act. And
there are sector-specific privacy and data retention require92
ments in industries such as health care, publicly traded com93
94
panies, and finance. Overall, though, Internet platforms face
82. See generally Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 639–40 (7th
Cir. 2007); Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of
Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 296–311 (2005); Jacob W. Schneider, Note,
Preventing Data Breaches: Alternative Approaches To Deter Negligent Handling of Consumer Data, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 279, 286–90 (2009).
83. See Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 439–40 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (holding that the search engine’s blockade of certain search results was
protected speech under the First Amendment); Search King v. Google, Inc.,
No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003)
(holding Google’s page ranking system to be protected speech).
84. See 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a)(1) (2012).
85. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1465, 1466, 1466A (2012).
86. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A, 2258A(e).
87. Compare Perfect 10, Inc., v. CCBill L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 118–19 (9th
Cir. 2007) (holding claims for infringement of state rights of publicity blocked
by 47 U.S.C. § 230), with Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc., v. Lycos, Inc., 478
F.3d 413, 418–19 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating that state-based intellectual property
claims are not subject to Section 230 immunity).
88. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521 F.3d 1157,
1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that provider immunity under the CDA applies
only if the provider took no part in creating the content).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012).
90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2012); 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2015).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012).
92. See 45 C.F.R. § 160 (2015) (setting universal standards for health care
industry data sharing and retention).
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012) (requiring certain publicly-traded companies to report on the “internal control” of their data).

2015]

AGAINST JAWBONING

65

far fewer content regulations than offline analogues such as
95
96
television stations and newspapers.
Thus, government regulation of content on Internet platforms is at times constitutionally proscribed, at times forbidden
by statute, and at times limited to federal enforcement. These
limits have caused would-be regulators to shift to informal efforts. In addition to evading legal constraints, informal enforcement has other benefits for government. It reduces regulatory cost: rather than having to pass laws or promulgate rules,
state actors can turn directly to implementing their policies.
And, bypassing procedural requirements reduces expenditures
as well. Informal enforcement also shifts reputational risk to
private actorsit cloaks what is in reality state action in the
97
guise of private choice. Thus, government is less likely to be
held to account, either directly or through public criticism. In
short, constraints upon direct regulation of platforms and content have forced government actors to become creative with enforcement.
To support the claim that jawboning has become increasingly common, this Article offers four case studies, in addition
to the one on Operation Goliath that opened the narrative:
Backpage, data retention, Six Strikes, and network neutrality.
B. BACKPAGE: THE INTERNET’S SEEDY SIDE
Backpage.com is the Internet version of a newspaper’s
classified ads section: one can find ads selling used cars, fishing
poles, petsand sex. The site’s “adult” section has a category
for escorts, among other options, and prostitution ads are ubiquitous. A study by Arizona State University found that almost
eighty percent of the ads in the adult section were for prosti94. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–08 (2012) (establishing customer privacy
standards for financial institutions); 16 C.F.R. §§ 314.1–4.5 (2015) (establishing customer privacy standards for all financial institutions over which the
Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction).
95. Compare Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 670
(2004) (applying strict scrutiny to regulation of Internet content), with Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 190 (1997) (applying intermediate scrutiny to regulation of cable television content).
96. For example, newspapers can be liable for publishing defamatory material, while Internet platforms cannot. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012); see, e.g., N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286 (1964) (noting that the defendantnewspaper could have been held liable for libel had the plaintiff shown that
the newspaper had acted with “actual malice”).
97. See Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, supra note 58, at 901 (arguing that
informal enforcement via persuasion runs the risk that “governmental goals
may be disguised as objectives of private firms”).
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98

tutes. Moreover, some of those being advertised as available
99
for sex are minors.
Those ads have made Backpage a target. State attorneys
general have accused Backpage of being a “hub for illegal services [that] has proven particularly enticing for those seeking
100
to sexually exploit minors.” Columnist Nicholas Kristof of the
New York Times lambasted the site as “a godsend to pimps, al101
lowing customers to order a girl online as if she were a pizza.”
And Detroit police suggested that the site might be to blame for
the murders of women who placed escort service ads on
102
Backpage.
State legislatures in New Jersey, Tennessee, and Washing103
ton passed bills targeting Backpage.com. The new laws imposed criminal penalties for knowingly publishing or dissemi104
nating commercial sex ads involving minors. Similarly, in
2011, attorneys general from 46 states signed a letter demanding that Backpage substantiate its claims that the site carefully
105
polices ads in the adult section, or face a subpoena.
The problem with the new laws and demands was that
they were plainly unenforceable. In 1996, as part of its legislative overhaul of telecommunications regulation, Congress
passed (and President Clinton signed) a bill with a provision
granting interactive computer services, such as Backpage.com,
broad immunity from state civil and criminal claims. Section
230 of the CDA provides that “no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information
98. J.J. Hensley, ASU Study: Most Ads on Backpage’s Adult Section for
Prostitution, AZCENTRAL (Aug. 25, 2012), http://www.azcentral.com/news/
articles/20120824backpage-ads-prostitution-asu.html.
99. See Suzanne Choney, Classified Ad Site Backpage in Crosshairs over
Child Sex Ads, NBC NEWS (July 29, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech
-news/classified-ad-site-backpage-crosshairs-over-child-sex-ads-f6C10789250.
100. Letter from Nat’l Assoc. of Attorneys Gen. to Samuel Fifer, Counsel,
Backpage.com (Aug. 31, 2011) [hereinafter N.A.A.G. Letter], http://
agportals3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploadedfiles/Home/News/Press_
Releases/2011/NAAG_Backpage_Signon_08-31-11_Final.pdf .
101. Nicholas D. Kristof, How Pimps Use the Web To Sell Girls, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2012, at A31.
102. See Detroit Police Say Killings May Be Linked to Backpage.com,
KING5 (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.king5.com/story/local/2015/01/09/13047416.
103. See Stephanie Silvano, Note, Fighting a Losing Battle To Win the War:
Can States Combat Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking Despite CDA Preemption?,
83 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 390–92 (2014).
104. Id.; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13315 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104 (repealed 2013).
105. N.A.A.G. Letter, supra note 100.
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107

content provider.” Federal criminal statutes are exempted,
but state laws that contravene this provision are expressly
108
blocked from enforcement. A plethora of case law interpreting
Section 230 makes clear that statutes like those in New Jersey,
Tennessee, and Washington, which sought to hold Backpage li109
able for content created by its users, were pre-empted. Legal
liability under those laws turned upon Backpage’s decision to
publish or disseminate material created by others, which is
110
precisely the sort of choice protected under Section 230. Furthermore, the legislatures in the three states adopted the new
statutes only after years of pressure from their respective law
enforcement agencies, and in particular their attorneys general, on Backpage to police its adult section more aggressive111
ly. There is no doubt that the firm was the target of the stat106. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
107. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1).
108. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (“No cause of action may be brought and no
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with
this section.”).
109. See, e.g., Universal Commc’ns, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418–
19 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding message board operator protected from liability for
content created by user); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119, 1125
(9th Cir. 2003) (holding Internet dating site immune from tort liability based
on content created by user); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 468 (3d
Cir. 2003) (immunizing ISP for allegedly failing to police its services for unlawful content created by users). See generally David S. Ardia, Free Speech
Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOYOLA L.A. L.
REV. 373 (2010) (performing empirical and doctrinal analysis of Section 230
cases). Tennessee, which sits in the Sixth Circuit, did not have a case from
that appellate court interpreting the statute when the legislation passed. But
see Backpage.com v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 822 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (citing circuit court cases interpreting Section 230’s immunity as wide-ranging).
Unsurprisingly, however, the Sixth Circuit interpreted Section 230 as every
other court of appeals has done once it ruled in 2014. See Jones v. Dirty World
Entm’t Recordings L.L.C., 755 F.3d 398, 413 (6th Cir. 2014).
110. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). Backpage is clearly an interactive computer service, which the statute defines as “any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users
to a computer server.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). Theoretically, a statute could impose liability upon distributors of unlawful content, since the relevant provision addresses only publishers and speakers. However, an early, seminal
Fourth Circuit case interpreted distributor liability as a subset of publisher
liability, and later courts have adopted that approach. Zeran v. Am. Online,
129 F.3d 327, 332–33 (4th Cir. 1997); see Jones, 755 F.3d at 407–08; Barnes v.
Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096, 1103–05 (9th Cir. 2009); Green, 318 F.3d at 470–71.
111. See Backpage.com v. Hoffman, No. 13-cv-03952 (DMC)(JAD), 2013 WL
4502097, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013) (noting New Jersey’s statute was expressly modeled on the Washington statute); Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 819
(“Backpage.com has shown sufficient evidence that it is the direct target of the
law . . . . Even if the statute did not directly target Backpage.com . . . [it] has
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112

utes. And New Jersey knew its statute was likely unenforceable when the legislation was introducedby that date, the
nearly identical Washington and Tennessee laws had already
113
been blocked by federal district courts in those states. By
March 2013, when the New Jersey legislature passed its statute, Washington had agreed not only to work to repeal its law,
114
but to pay Backpage $200,000 in attorneys’ fees.
New Jersey, Tennessee, and Washington all responded to
the significant problems of prostitution and of sex trafficking in
minors through both formal and informal pressures. The states
had good reason to try: similar tactics pushed Craigslist to remove its “adult services” section, even though the company had
115
prevailed against attempts to hold it liable under state law.
The formal pressureslitigation explicitly targeting Backpage
as a hub for illegal sex workwere plainly unlawful. Indeed,
the National Association of Attorneys General conceded as
much in a 2013 letter urging Congress to amend Section 230a
letter citing Section 230 case law establishing broad immunity
that pre-dated the New Jersey, Tennessee, and Washington
116
legislation. This makes the informal pressures used by those
states illegitimate as well. Threats to pursue enforcement of
the bills unless Backpage complied with demands, such as to
monitor and remove content more actively, are not legitimate.
Backpage faced unattractive options: comply, risk prosecution
nonetheless alleged sufficient facts to establish a credible threat of prosecution . . . .”); Backpage.com v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1270 (W.D.
Wash. 2012) (“Washington legislators have openly stated that the challenged
statute is aimed at Backpage.com . . . .”).
112. See Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *3; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 819;
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.
113. See Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *1–2 (noting that the New Jersey
legislation was introduced Oct. 4, 2012); Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 816 (noting that the Washington legislation was enjoined preliminarily on July 27,
2012); id. at 818 (noting that Tennessee stipulated it would not enforce law
during pendency of suit on June 29, 2012).
114. See Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *2 (listing dates); State Agrees To
Work To Repeal Law Opposed by Backpage.com, Q13 FOX NEWS (Dec. 7, 2012,
8:51 PM), http://q13fox.com/2012/12/07/state-agrees-to-work-to-repeal-lawopposed-by-backpage-com-provide-200k-in-attorneys-fees.
115. See M.A. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1058–59
(E.D. Mo. 2011); David Sarno, Craigslist To Remove Erotic Services Section,
Monitor Adult Services Posts [Updated], L.A. TIMES (May 13, 2009, 8:40 AM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2009/05/craigslist-attorneys
-general-erotic-services-prostitution.html.
116. Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen. to Senator John Rockefeller
IV, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., et al. (July 23,
2013), https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/739520/ags
-anti-230-letter.pdf.

2015]

AGAINST JAWBONING

69

and concomitant damage to the company’s business, or undertake the expense of challenging the statutes. The firm chose the
third option, and won. But the costs were a waste: it was clear
the legislation was pre-empted, and that its reason for passage
was to punish Backpage by imposing litigation costs. Government cannot operate outside the law, even for a noble
causeparticularly when it attempts to regulate speech.
The states did have lawful options. They could have sought
to persuade the Department of Justice to investigate Backpage,
since there is a federal criminal statute prohibiting similar
conduct featuring minors that is not pre-empted by Section
117
230. They could have urged consumers to boycott the service
118
if it did not improve its monitoring. They could have expanded law enforcement use of Backpage to prosecute sex traffickersthe site, after all, keeps identifying information and credit
119
card details about advertisers. The states had a range of
permissible options, and could have threatened Backpage with
any of them if the service failed to comply. Informal enforcement will often be legitimate. Here, though, the absence of any
lawful basis for the threats meant that it was not.
C. DATA RETENTION: BUILDING YOUR PERMANENT FILE
The government wants your Internet Service Provider to
120
help it assemble your database of ruin.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012); 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2012); see Cooper, 939
F. Supp. 2d at 825–26 (describing differences between Section 1591 and Tennessee statute).
118. See, e.g., Matt Driscoll, Mayor McGinn Announces an End to City’s
Advertising Boycott of Seattle Weekly, SEATTLE WEEKLY NEWS (Sept. 26,
2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.seattleweekly.com/dailyweekly/2012/09/mayor_
mcginn_announces_end_seattles_advertising_boycott_of_seattle_weekly.php
(noting that the city ended the boycott after paper owner separated from
Backpage).
119. See Daniel Fisher, Backpage Takes Heat, but Prostitution Ads Are
Everywhere, FORBES (Jan. 26, 2012, 9:25 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
danielfisher/2012/01/26/backpages-takes-heat-for-prostitution-ads-that-are
-everywhere (noting that the person posting the ad highlighted by Nicholas
Kristof in the New York Times supplied a credit card number that allowed law
enforcement to identify him); Eric Nicholson, Dallas Police Are Now Posting
Prostitution Ads on Backpage.com, DALLAS OBSERVER (Sept. 20, 2013), http://
www.dallasobserver.com/news/dallas-police-are-now-posting-prostitution-ads
-on-backpagecom-7140623.
120. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1746 (2010) (defining
the “database of ruin” as “the worldwide collection of all of the facts held by
third parties that can be used to cause privacy-related harm to almost every
member of society”). I may be re-interpreting Ohm’s concept somewhat; his
villains are “identity thieves, blackmailers, and unscrupulous advertisers,”
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In April 2005, the Department of Justice pressed ISPs to
adopt voluntarily a system of archiving records of users’ Inter121
net activities for months, if not years. The Justice Department deployed several arguments. One was reputational: the
president of the trade group U.S. Internet Industry Association
recounted that, “We were told, ‘You’re going to have to start
thinking about data retention if you don’t want people to think
122
you’re soft on child porn.’” The government also advanced the
specter of mandatory data retention legislationa proposal
that the same administration had rejected a few years earlier
123
as unnecessary and unduly burdensome. The message was
clear: keep records voluntarily, or face a potentially costly and
cumbersome legal mandate.
124
Pressure increased in 2006. At the Davos Economic Forum in January, FBI Director Robert Mueller spoke out in favor of harmonizing countries’ cybercrime laws to include
“standardized regulations and rules relating to data reten125
tion.” Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael
Chertoff indicated in March 2006 that he too favored such a
126
mandate. ISPs remained reluctant to retain data voluntarily
(or to be compelled to do so), citing both the lack of evidence of
127
law enforcement need and potential privacy risks. In April,
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales pushed providers during a
speech at the National Center for Missing and Exploited Chil128
dren. After recounting graphic depictions of child pornograand regulators his white knights. Id. I am perhaps more skeptical of governmental efforts, but regardless of who assembles it, merely having a long-term
collection of our Internet activities would pose risks from both public and private actors.
121. Declan McCullagh, Your ISP as Net Watchdog, CNET (June 16, 2005,
6:42 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/Your-isp-as-net-watchdog.
122. Id. Even after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of
Justice still rejected mandatory data retention. Id. at 2 (quoting Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Comments of the United States on the
European Commission Communication on Combating Computer Crime at the
European Union Forum on Cybercrime at Brussels (Nov. 27, 2001)).
123. Id. at 1.
124. See Anita L. Allen, Dredging up the Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and
Surveillance, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 70 n.86 (2008).
125. Declan McCullagh, ISP Snooping Gaining Support, CNET (Apr. 14,
2006, 1:49 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/isp-snooping-gaining-support.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2. Since 1996, law enforcement and other government agencies
have the authority to require ISPs to preserve designated records for up to 180
days upon request. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 18
U.S.C. § 2703(f) (2012) (effective Apr. 24, 1996).
128. See Anne Broache, U.S. Attorney General Calls for “Reasonable” Data
Retention, CNET (Apr. 20, 2006, 3:58 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/u-s
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phy and sexual abuse, Gonzales stated that “the failure of some
Internet service providers to keep records has hampered our
ability to conduct investigations in this area,” and noted that he
had “asked the appropriate experts at the Department to examine this issue and provide [him] with proposed recommenda129
tions.”
Industry reluctance to adopt data retention, in turn, generated threats from the administration and Congress to seek
legislation. Bush administration officials endorsed a congressional proposal for a one-year requirement, and the bill’s sponsor in the House of Representatives attacked ISPs for opposing
130
it. Attorney General Gonzales then pressed providers in private meetings to go beyond the proposed legislation and retain
identifying records for two years, illustrating his point by sharing pixelated photos of child pornography with network provid131
ers.
Jawboning worked, at least in part. At hearings by a House
committee on the sexual exploitation of minors, one major ISP,
Comcast, agreed to voluntarily retain data for 180 days to aid
132
law enforcement. The Bush administration renewed pressure
in 2007, as Representative Lamar Smith introduced a data retention bill, backed by criminal penalties, that would have enabled Attorney General Gonzales to set the scope and require133
ments for recordkeeping. Even after Gonzales’ resignation,
the FBI continued to press for the mandate, and proposed expanding its scope to require search engines to maintain records
134
of searches on their sites. The pattern of pressure on ISPs,
-attorney-general-calls-for-reasonable-data-retention.
129. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, Prepared Remarks at the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) (Apr. 20, 2006),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_060420.html.
130. See Anne Broache, Backer of ISP Snooping Slams Industry, CNET
(May 4, 2006, 9:30 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/backer-of-isp-snooping
-slams-industry; Declan McCullagh, Republican Politico Endorses Data Retention, CNET (May 5, 2006, 1:35 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/republican
-politico-endorses-data-retention.
131. See Declan McCullagh, Gonzales Pressures ISPs on Data Retention,
CNET (May 30, 2006, 4:01 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/gonzales-pressures
-ISPs-on-data-retention.
132. See Benjamin R. Davis, Comment, Ending the Cyber Jihad: Combating Terrorist Exploitation of the Internet with the Rule of Law and Improved
Tools for Cyber Governance, 15 J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 119, 157 (2006).
133. See Declan McCullagh, GOP Revives ISP-Tracking Legislation, CNET
(Feb. 7, 2007, 7:07 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/gop-revives-isp-tracking
-legislation.
134. See Declan McCullagh, FBI, Politicos Renew Push for ISP Data Retention Laws, CNET (Apr. 24, 2008, 6:14 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/fbi
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backed by threats of legislation, continued after the change in
135
control to the Democratic Party under President Obama. Indeed, at a hearing in January 2011, Representative F. James
Sensenbrenner Jr., chair of the House Judiciary Subcommittee
on Crime, made the threat explicit to the executive director of
the U.S. Internet Service Provider Association: “[I]f you aren’t a
good rabbit and don’t start eating the carrot, I am afraid that
136
we are all going to be throwing the stick at you.” Whatever
the merits of the mixed metaphor, to date the rabbit has
spurned the carrot, with no stick forthcoming.
The story of data retention is thus one of an ongoing bluff:
administrations of both major political parties cajole ISPs to
adopt archiving measures, with the threat (sometimes explicit,
sometimes implicit) of costly, onerous legislation if the providers fail to comply. Recording user information has been on the
policy agenda of the Department of Justice at least since 1999,
when Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder stated that “certain
data must be retained by ISPs for reasonable periods of time”
137
to fight child pornography. Under President Obama, the Department of Justice went on record in both 2011 and 2012 to
138
support mandatory data retention legislation. Yet, the closest
that Congress has come to enacting legislation was in 2011,
when the “Protecting Children From Internet Pornographers
139
Act of 2011” passed the House Judiciary Committee, but
140
failed to progress further. Indeed, in 2006, the Department of

-politicos-renew-push-for-isp-data-retention-laws.
135. See Declan McCullagh, Justice Department Seeks Mandatory Data Retention, CNET (Jan. 24, 2011, 10:47 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/justice
-department-seeks-mandatory-data-retention.
136. Data Retention as a Tool for Investigating Internet Child Pornography
and Other Crimes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, &
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 46 (2011)
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner, Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
& Homeland Sec.).
137. Kevin V. Ryan & Mark L. Krotoski, Caution Advised: Avoid Undermining the Legitimate Needs of Law Enforcement To Solve Crimes Involving
the Internet in Amending the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 47
U.S.F. L. REV. 291, 341 (2012).
138. Id. at 342–43.
139. Protecting Children from Internet Pornographers Act of 2011, H.R.
1981, 112th Cong. (2011), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr1981
(last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
140. See Declan McCullagh, House Panel Approves Broadened ISP Snooping Bill, CNET (July 28, 2011, 1:41 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/house
-panel-approves-broadened-isp-snooping-bill.
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Justice admitted to reporters in private that the legislation was
141
too controversial to attempt in an election year.
So far, most ISPs have failed to comply, and some have
142
even reduced data retention. Providers resist these pressures
for economic reasons. Their customers fear incursions upon
privacy and might use the Net less if their activities were recorded. Further, infrastructure costs would rise, perhaps dra143
matically, if the ISPs were forced into a retention regime. Despite the twin specters of terrorism and child pornography,
governments led by both major parties have been utterly una144
ble to pass a data retention bill. Their legal authority to compel preservation remains limited in scope and time: to records
identified at the request of a government entity, and to a max145
imum of 180 days. More systemic data retention requirements could face constitutional challenges as violative of either
the First Amendment (by destroying the possibility of anonymous speech) or the Fourth Amendment (by imposing an un146
Privacy scholar Catherine Crump
constitutional search).
notes that the record-keeping requirements have already been
approved by the Supreme Court in the Fourth Amendment con147
text, but suggests the First Amendment path has merit.
Thus, efforts to jawbone ISPs into broader archiving not
148
only implicate important First Amendment, Fourth Amend149
150
ment, and privacy concerns, but also overreach, extending
141. See Declan McCullagh, FBI Director Wants ISPs To Track Users,
CNET (Oct. 18, 2006, 6:41 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/fbi-director-wants
-ISPs-to-track-users.
142. See Kim Hart, Yahoo Changes Data-Retention Policy, WASH. POST
(Dec. 17, 2008, 1:50 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2008/12/
yahoo_changes_data-retention_p.html.
143. See Kevin Bohn, Feds Put Squeeze on Internet Firms, CNN (May 31,
2006, 9:55 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2006/TECH/internet/05/30/internet
.records/index.html; Ellen Nakashima, Bill Would Make ISPs Keep Data on
Users, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2007), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021201337.html.
144. See generally Agatha M. Cole, Politics, Privacy, and Child Pornography: The Battle over Data Retention and H.R. 1981, CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
(Mar. 4, 2012), http://www.cardozoaelj.com/agatha_blog (describing the difficulties of passing data retention legislation).
145. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(2) (2012).
146. See Catherine Crump, Note, Data Retention: Privacy, Anonymity, and
Accountability Online, 56 STAN. L. REV. 191, 196 (2003).
147. Id. at 204–05, 223–28.
148. Cf. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)
(finding right to anonymous political speech protected by First Amendment).
149. Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the
warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site they had
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beyond any authority the state possesses or could realistically
151
expect to obtain. In the era of pervasive state surveillance of
data held by private firmsfrom Google to Facebook to e-mail
providersgovernment-driven data archiving that operates
152
outside formal legal channels should be viewed as suspect.
D. SIX STRIKES: “THE CAJOLE SET OF ISSUES”
In the summer of 2011, a number of large Internet Service
Providers announced that they would increase measures to
153
The plan,
prevent copyright infringement by their users.
known informally as “six strikes,” debuted as a Memorandum
of Understanding between the ISPs and content companies
such as Walt Disney Studios, Sony Pictures, and Warner Music
154
Group. Providers agreed to process notifications of alleged infringement from the content companies and to impose a series
of penalties (euphemistically termed “Copyright Alerts”) on the
155
users allegedly engaged in infringement. ISPs agreed to provisited in the last week, or month, or year.”).
150. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477,
504–15 (2006) (discussing harms from aggregation and identification of data).
151. See ECPA (Part I): Lawful Access to Stored Content Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., & Investigations of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 63 (2013) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner, Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., &
Investigations) (“[Passing data retention legislation] is going to be kind of a
tough nut to crack.”).
152. See, e.g., Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to
Yahoo, Google Data Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST
(Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa
-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents
-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html (describing NSA’s MUSCULAR program for intercepting internal Google traffic);
Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects “Nearly Everything a User
Does on the Internet,” GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013, 8:56 AM), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data
(describing NSA tool used to access information such as e-mail content and
Facebook chats); Charlie Savage et al., Hunting for Hackers, N.S.A. Secretly
Expands Internet Spying at U.S. Border, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/us/hunting-for-hackers-nsa-secretly-expands
-internet-spying-at-us-border.html (describing warrantless collection of American data that crosses international borders).
153. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, CTR. FOR COPYRIGHT INFO. 24
(July 6, 2011), http://www.copyrightinformation.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/
02/Memorandum-of-Understanding.pdf (listing participating ISPs).
154. Id. at 25 (listing participating content owners).
155. Id. at 4–14; see Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response American
Style: “Six Strikes” Measured Against Five Norms, 23 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 5–6 (2012).
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vide half the funding for both a system of independent review
156
for challenged notifications and an organization dedicated to
157
implementing the six strikes program.
The ISPs’ decision to undertake six strikes is puzzling for
at least three reasons. First, providers are almost entirely
shielded from liability for transporting or hosting material that
infringes copyrights by the safe harbor provisions of the Digital
158
Millennium Copyright Act. Content owners have launched a
series of lawsuits against ISPs and Internet platforms over
159
hosting infringing material, without success. Thus, ISPs had
little if anything to fear from litigation. Second, the six strikes
program risked irritating the ISPs’ customers, especially if the
harsher mitigation measures contemplated under six strikes
160
were deployed. While consumers generally lack a wide range
of choices in broadband service providers, those with more than
one option could respond to a Copyright Alert by changing
161
162
ISPs. Third, Internet providers benefit from infringement.

156. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 153, at 14.
157. Id. at 4; see generally Mary LaFrance, Graduated Response by Industry Compact: Piercing the Black Box, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 165 (2012)
(describing the formulation of the Memorandum of Understanding and its
components).
158. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
159. See, e.g., UMG Recordings v. Shelter Capital Partners L.L.C., 718 F.3d
1006 (9th Cir. 2013); Viacom Int’l v. YouTube, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012); Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C.
Cir. 2003); see also Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1837 (2000). But see Complaint for Copyright Infringement, BMG Rights Mgmt. v. Cox Enters., No. 1:14-cv-1611 (LOG/JFA)
(E.D. Va. Nov. 26, 2014) (seeking to hold ISP liable for failure to terminate repeat copyright infringers as required under 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)). I thank Fred
von Lohmann for pointing me to the pending Cox litigation.
160. See Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private
Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV. 81, 101 (2010).
161. FCC, INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2013
9
(2014),
https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2014/
db1016/DOC-329973A1.pdf (showing over 90% of households are served by two
or more ISPs).
162. Some scholars suggest ISPs were willing to adopt six strikes because
infringing content was overburdening their networks. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu,
The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1385 (2010) (“ISPs were annoyed by how Internet file-sharers have abused the service by hogging bandwidth, congesting the network, and reducing the overall user experience of
most other subscribers.”). If this were true, one would expect ISPs independently to take voluntary measures, as Comcast did when it throttled
BitTorrent. See Comcast v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The fact
that ISPs did not do so strongly suggests that this argument for six strikes is
incorrect.
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Access to costless copyrighted material is attractive to some users, who are willing to pay for faster connections to stream or
163
download the content. Reducing infringement would risk not
only driving users away, but also making the ISPs’ services less
attractive to them. In short, six strikes looked like a bad bargain for ISPs. So why agree to spend money for a program that
seemed to offer only costs and not benefits?
The answer is likely jawboning. The Obama administration, via Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator Victoria Espinel, was intimately involved in the negotiations between the content companies and the ISPson the side of
164
Hollywood. The administration had been interested in forcing
ISPs to implement “graduated response” measurespenalizing
and eventually disconnecting users who engage in intellectual
property infringementby including such a requirement in the
165
international Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).
166
However, other countries negotiating ACTA balked, and the
167
final provisions did not include graduated response. A weak
version of graduated response already existed as part of the
168
safe harbor provisions for service providers in the DMCA, but
169
it was viewed as inadequate by content companies.
Thwarted in the international arena, the administration
turned to a different vehicle: private bargains between ISPs
170
and content firms. Then-New York Attorney General Andrew
Cuomo brought the two sides together for discussions in
171
2008, the same year that the Prioritizing Resources and Or163. Cf. Chris Morran, Movie Studios Claim that Google Fiber Leads to
More Piracy, CONSUMERIST (Dec. 29, 2014), http://consumerist.com/2014/12/
29/movie-studios-claim-that-google-fiber-leads-to-more-piracy (discussing survey indicating increase in piracy after Google Fiber deployment in Kansas
City).
164. See David Kravets, U.S. Copyright Czar Cozied up to Content Industry, E-mails Show, WIRED (Oct. 14, 2011, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/
2011/10/ copyright-czar-cozies-up.
165. See AdamCondeNast, ACTA Backs away from 3 Strikes, WIRED (Apr.
21, 2010, 4:10 PM), http://www.wired.com/2010/04/acta-treaty.
166. See id.
167. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Oct. 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M. 243
(2011); Annemarie Bridy, ACTA and the Specter of Graduated Response, 26
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 559, 561 (2011).
168. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2012); see Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill L.L.C., 488 F.3d 1102, 1109–13 (9th Cir. 2007); Yu, supra note 162, at 1374, 1403–07.
169. See Bridy, supra note 167, at 572.
170. See generally Bridy, supra note 160 (discussing interindustry cooperation between rights owners and ISPs).
171. See David Kravets, ISPs To Disrupt Internet Access of Copyright Scoff-
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ganization for Intellectual Property Act established the office of
the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC) in
172
the executive branch. President Obama appointed Victoria
Espinel as his first IPEC, and the Senate confirmed her on De173
cember 4, 2009. She became involved in the six strikes negotiations immediately; on December 22, she received a list of the
174
talking points for Sony Pictures’ CEO in the talks. The same
month, Vice President Joe Biden convened a copyright enforcement meeting that included law enforcement, the IPEC,
175
and content companiesbut not ISPs.
Espinel’s role became plain by January 2010, when Alec
French, the vice president of government relations at NBC
Universal, asked her for help with “the cajole set of issues” in
176
the bargaining with ISPs over graduated response. French
was close enough to Espinel that he sent the request to her per177
sonal e-mail address. Espinel met with representatives of the
Recording Industry Association of America, the Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA), and NBC Universal in September 2010 about the project; the meeting invitation from
Espinel noted that it was on the birthday of one of the MPAA

laws, WIRED (July 7, 2011, 11:08 AM), http://www.wired.com/2011/07/
disrupting-internet-access.
172. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, § 301, 122 Stat. 4256, 4264–66 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8111 (2012)).
173. See Victoria Espinel, WHITE HOUSE BLOG, https://www.whitehouse
.gov/blog/author/victoria-espinel (last updated July 15, 2013, 7:33 AM).
174. See E-mail from DeDe Lea to Victoria Espinel (Dec. 22, 2009), in EXHIBIT 8: REDACTED FOIA DOCUMENTS 1, 60 (Apr. 27, 2012) http://blogs
.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/files/2012/07/Soghoian_Redacted_Docs.pdf. The email to Espinel was released in response to a Freedom of Information Act
(FoIA) request by privacy researcher Chris Soghoian for documents about the
Obama administration’s involvement in the negotiations. See Soghoian v. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 932 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D.D.C. 2013). Disclosure: the author represented Soghoian in his FoIA suit against Office of Management and
Budget (OMB).
175. See John M. Owen, Note, Graduated Response Systems and the Market for Copyrighted Works, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 559, 585–86 (2012).
176. See E-mail from Alec French to Victoria Espinel (Jan. 6, 2010), in REDACTED FOIA DOCUMENTS, supra note 174, at 59 (asking for a short call “to
explore important development related to graduated response, and directly
related to the cajole set of issues”). French held his position at NBC from 2005
to 2010. Alec French, Esq., THORSEN FRENCH ADVOC., http://thorsen-french
.com/alecfrench.shtml (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
177. See E-mail from Victoria Espinel to Alec French (Jan. 6, 2010), in REDACTED FOIA DOCUMENTS, supra note 174, at 60 (Espinel explaining “[I] only
check my gmail intermittently now so much quicker to reach me on omb [sic]
email”).
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178

executives. And, in November 2010, Universal Music sent the
179
ISPs’ proposed version of the agreement to Espinel. IPEC was
plainly on Hollywood’s side. The administration and IPEC did
more than just advise, thoughthey threatened ISPs with unfavorable legislation if the firms failed to reach a voluntary
180
deal, part of a long track record of pro-copyright owner poli181
cy.
The providers took the hint, agreeing to a Copyright Alert
182
System, popularly titled “six strikes,” in mid-2011. Espinel
183
trumpeted the deal in a post to the White House blog. In
short, the Obama administration achieved through jawboning
184
that which it was unable to get through international law.
185

E. NETWORK NEUTRALITY: “I AM NOT A DINGO”

Network neutrality is a hopeful jawboning story. Over the
span of a decade, the Federal Communications Commission has
moved its efforts to ensure non-discrimination for Internet traffic from jawboning vaguely grounded in non-binding policy
statements to formal rulemaking that brings Internet carriage
squarely under the Commission’s authority.
178. Meeting Invitation from Victoria Espinel to James Schuelke, Kathleen
Seighman, and Alan Hoffman, in REDACTED FOIA DOCUMENTS, supra note
174, at 49. The meeting was set for September 7, 2010.
179. E-mail from Matthew Gerson to Victoria Espinel (Nov. 12, 2010), in
REDACTED FOIA DOCUMENTS, supra note 174, at 2 (including the “ISPs’ proposed cleanup of the draft agreement”).
180. See Jason Mick, Obama Conscripts ISPs as “Copyright Cops,” Unveils
“Six Strikes” Plan, DAILYTECH (July 8, 2011), http://www.dailytech.com/
Obama+Conscripts+ISPs+as+Copyright+Cops+Unveils+Six+Strikes+Plan/
article22107.htm.
181. See Greg Sandoval, Exclusive: Top ISPs Poised To Adopt Graduated
Response to Piracy, CNET (June 22, 2011), http://www.cnet.com/news/
exclusive-top-isps-poised-to-adopt-graduated-response-to-piracy.
182. See Mick, supra note 180. The Memorandum of Understanding was
signed on July 6, 2011. See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note
153.
183. See Victoria Espinel, Working Together To Stop Internet Piracy,
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 7, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
2011/07/07/working-together-stop-internet-piracy.
184. See David Kravets, Copyright Treaty Is Policy Laundering at Its Finest, WIRED (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.wired.com/2009/11/policy-laundering.
185. Tom Risen, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler: “I Am Not a Dingo,” U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 13, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/
washington-whispers/2014/06/13/fcc-chairman-tom-wheeler-i-am-not-a-dingo.
Wheeler was responding to comedian John Oliver’s criticism of his background
as a telecommunications industry lobbyist; Oliver proclaimed that hiring
Wheeler as FCC Chair was “the equivalent of needing a babysitter and hiring
a dingo.” Id. Thanks to Alan Trammell for this reference.
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186

The path began in rural North Carolina in 2004. The local telecommunications company, Madison River Communications, noted an increase in customers using Voice over Internet
187
Protocol (VoIP) to make long-distance telephone calls. VoIP
calls undercut Madison River’s profitable long-distance service
188
over the conventional telephone system. The firm turned to
189
self-help: it blocked VoIP traffic on its network. Customers
complained to the VoIP provider Vonage and the FCC launched
190
Madison River surrendered quickly: on
an investigation.
191
under
March 3, 2005, the FCC announced a settlement,
which the company would cease blocking VoIP and would pay a
192
voluntary fine of $15,000. Formally, the Commission based
its decision on its ability to ensure that common carriers en193
gage in practices that are “just and reasonable.” However,
since this was the first instance of the FCC regulating blocking
of an Internet application, it was not plain that the practice fell
194
within its statutory remit.
The real rationale for the FCC’s action against Madison
River had emerged a year earlier, in a speech titled “Preserving
Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the Industry” by
195
Chair Michael Powell. Powell outlined the benefits of Inter186. Conceptually, it begins in 2003, when Tim Wu coined the term “network neutrality.” Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2
J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003).
187. See Matt Evans, How a Triad Company Helped Open the Debate over
Net Neutrality, TRIAD BUS. J. BIZBLOG (May 15, 2014), http://www
.bizjournals.com/triad/blog/2014/05/how-a-triad-company-helped-open-the
-debate-over.html.
188. Id.; see Daniel A. Lyons, Internet Policy’s Next Frontier: Usage-Based
Broadband Pricing, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 43 (2013).
189. See Lyons, supra note 188; Evans, supra note 187.
190. See Lyons, supra note 188; Evans, supra note 187.
191. Order, Madison River Commc’ns, L.L.C., No. EB-05-IH-0110 (F.C.C.
Mar. 3, 2005).
192. Consent Decree, Madison River Commc’ns, L.L.C., No. EB-05-IH0110, at 2 (F.C.C. Mar. 3, 2005).
193. Id. at 1 n.1 (“All charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for
and in connection with such communication service, shall be just and reasonable . . . .” (citing 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000))).
194. See Stacey Higginbotham, A Net Neutrality Timeline: How We Got
Here, GIGAOM (Dec. 21, 2010), https://gigaom.com/2010/12/21/a-net-neutrality
-timeline-how-we-got-here.
195. Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, Preserving Internet Freedom:
Guiding Principles for the Industry, Speech at the University of Colorado
School of Law Silicon Flatirons Symposium (Feb. 8, 2004); see Richard S.
Whitt, Evolving Broadband Policy: Taking Adaptive Stances To Foster Optimal Internet Platforms, 17 J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 417, 505–06 (2009). See generally Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What a
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net freedom, noting that most providers already offered open
196
access to their customers. He pledged to be vigilant, though,
197
to “keep a sharp eye on market practices.” To offer Internet
firms a “clear road map,” he challenged them to preserve four
“Internet Freedoms”: freedom to access content, use applications, attach personal devices, and obtain service plan infor198
mation. While the FCC nominally grounded its enforcement
action in its authorizing statute, the truth is that “Madison
River was the first major case of the FCC going after a company for violating open Internet principles” set out in Powell’s
199
speech.
In August 2005, the FCC removed the common carriage rationale for network neutrality regulation by reclassifying
200
wireline broadband Internet access as an information service.
Instead, the Commission adoptedon the same daya statement of principles putatively based upon a congressional directive to encourage broadband deployment, but in fact enact201
ing Powell’s Internet Freedoms as policy. There were four
202
expressly non-binding principles. First, consumers could access all lawful Internet content. Second, users could run applications and services subject to law enforcement needs. Third,
customers could connect to legal devices that did not harm the
network. Finally, Americans should enjoy competition among
203
providers of networks, applications, services, and content.
The FCC did not have to wait long to test its policy stateNondiscrimination Rule Should Look Like, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2015); Tejas N.
Narechania, Federal and State Authority for Network Neutrality and Broadband Regulation, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
196. Powell, supra note 195, at 3.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 5–6.
199. See Aaron Sankin, The Worst Net Neutrality Violations in History,
DAILY DOT (May 21, 2014), http://www.dailydot.com/politics/net-neutrality
-violations-history.
200. Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities,
20 F.C.C. Rcd. 14,853, 14,857 (2005).
201. Policy Statement, In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access
to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, C.C. Docket No. 02-33, at 2 (F.C.C.
Aug. 5, 2005); see 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012) (incorporating the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and directing FCC to “encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all
Americans”).
202. Policy Statement, In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access
to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, C.C. Docket No. 02-33, at 3 n.15 (“[W]e
are not adopting rules in this policy statement.”).
203. Id. at 3.
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ment. In 2007, Comcast customer Robb Topolski noticed he was
having trouble using the BitTorrent peer-to-peer application
204
despite his speedy broadband connection. The technologicallytalented Topolski ran tests that confirmed his troubles: Comcast was deliberately interfering with BitTorrent to slow its
205
The public interest groups Free Press and Public
use.
Knowledge filed complaints with the FCC, which moved to in206
vestigate. At a Senate committee hearing the following April,
FCC Chair Kevin Martin rejected calls for network neutrality
legislation, noting that the 2005 open Internet policy statement
enabled the Commission to act on a case-by-case basisa claim
207
disputed by senators on the committee. In August 2008, the
FCC moved to prohibit Comcast’s interference with peer-to208
peer traffic. While the Commission dutifully cited its ancillary statutory authority as one set of grounds for the enforcement action, the first authority it pointed to was the 2005
209
statement and the FCC noted the case was about “authority
210
to enforce federal policy,” rather than any statutory grant.
Comcast appealed the agency’s decision to the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals, which ruled that a policy statement was insufficient basis for enforcement, since policies “[were] not dele211
gations of regulatory authority.” Moreover, the FCC’s claims
to ancillary authority failed for lack of a predicate: the agency
did not identify any statutory power to which its operations
212
were tied. The anti-throttling order was reversed.
While the Comcast case proceeded in the D.C. Circuit, the
FCC moved once again to make its policy mandates more closely tied to its formal authority. In October 2009, the Commission
204. See Peter Eckersley et al., Packet Forgery by ISPs: A Report on the
Comcast Affair, EFF (Nov. 28, 2007), https://www.eff.org/wp/packet-forgery
-isps-report-comcast-affair.
205. See id. Interestingly, the technique Comcast used is quite similar to
the one that China’s Great Firewall employs. See Bulletin 05: Probing Chinese
Search Engine Filtering, OPENNET INITIATIVE, (Aug. 19, 2004), https://
opennet.net/bulletins/005 (describing use of RST packets at TCP level).
206. Memorandum Opinion and Order, Formal Complaint of Free Press
and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading
Peer-to-Peer Applications, No. EB-08-IH-1518, at 5 (F.C.C. Aug. 1, 2008)
[hereinafter Formal Complaint of Free Press].
207. See Grant Gross, FCC’s Martin: Comcast Blocking Was Widespread,
MACWORLD (Apr. 22, 2008), http://www.macworld.com/article/1133112/
comcast_p2p.html.
208. Formal Complaint of Free Press, supra note 206, at 1.
209. Id. at 7–17.
210. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
211. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 654 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
212. Id. at 658–61.
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proposed open Internet rules to be a “codification of the existing
Internet policy principles” along with “additional principles of
213
nondiscrimination and transparency” based on its statutory
powers under Section 706(a) of the Telecommunications Act of
214
1996. After receiving public comments, the FCC adopted the
215
rules as its Open Internet Order in December 2010. While the
Commission linked its policy prescriptions to a specific grant of
statutory authority, its effort was nonetheless challenged be216
fore the D.C. Circuit, this time by Verizon. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Commission that it had authority under
217
Section 706(a) to regulate net neutrality a significant victory for the FCCbut rejected the anti-discrimination and anti218
blocking rules. The D.C. Circuit found that these rules effectively treated network providers as common carriers, contrary
to the FCC’s earlier decisions to remove providers from the
219
common carriage regime of Title II.
To effectuate the principles first outlined by Powell in
2004, the FCC would have to go the last mile for net neutrality:
220
reclassifying broadband Internet service as subject to Title II.
FCC Chair Tom Wheeler sought to do just thatproposing the
“FCC use its Title II authority to implement and enforce open
221
internet protections.” The full Commission voted to adopt his
222
proposal on February 26, 2015. Thus, with network neutrali213. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Preserving the Open Internet, G.N.
Docket No. 09-191, at 4 (F.C.C. Oct. 22, 2009).
214. Id. at 36–37.
215. Report and Order, Preserving the Open Internet, G.N. Docket No. 09191 (F.C.C. Dec. 21, 2010).
216. See Andrew Crocker, Verizon v. FCC: Verizon Challenges FCC’s Open
Internet Order, JOLT DIGEST (July 10, 2012), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/
digest/telecommunications/verizon-v-fcc.
217. Verizon v. FCC, No. 11-1355, slip op. at 17 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[W]e
start and end our analysis with section 706 of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act, which . . . furnishes the Commission with the requisite affirmative authority to adopt the regulations.”).
218. Id. at 63.
219. Id. at 45–60.
220. See id. at 10–12; John Blevins, A Fragile Foundation—The Role of “Intermodal” and “Facilities-Based” Competition in Communications Policy, 60
ALA. L. REV. 241, 252 n.42 (2009).
221. Wheeler, supra note 3.
222. See Julianne Pepitone, FCC Passes Net Neutrality Rules in Victory for
Open-Internet Activists, NBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.nbcnews
.com/tech/tech-news/fcc-passes-net-neutrality-rules-victory-open-internet
-activists-n313301; Tom Wheeler, Good News for Consumers, Innovators
and Financial Markets, FCC: OFFICIAL FCC BLOG (Feb. 26, 2015),
https://www.fcc.gov/blog/good-news-consumers-innovators-and-financial
-markets (announcing adoption of rules).
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ty, the FCC has gradually shifted from jawboningenforcement based on an official’s speech, sparsely
grounded in statuteto full-fledged rulemaking within the
223
FCC’s statutory powers.
The FCC’s net neutrality enforcement efforts show encouraging improvements in legitimacy over time. They offer a useful case study both of jawboning’s edges and of how state actors
can make their conduct more legitimate. At first, the FCC used
informal enforcement of its general common carriage rules to
force a quick settlement with Madison River, even though the
Commission would remove any force common carriage had a
few months later. Now, the Commission has adopted, through
formal rulemaking, a scheme that subjects Internet access and
carriage to classic Title II common carriage. Those rules are
certain to be challenged in court, but from the perspective of legitimacy, that is a benefit rather than a drawback: by proceeding (albeit reluctantly) to move net neutrality under the shield
of Title II, the FCC has helped regulated entities to obtain both
clarity and accountability. This is a lesson other state actors
could learn from.
This Part has documented the rise in jawboning as a tactic
employed by government to press Internet platforms to carry
out the state’s wishes. It is a popular method for regulators, especially when their formal authority is constrained. Jawboning
often occurs out of the limelight, and can be difficult (or at least
quite costly) to resist. Next, the Article turns to a normative
evaluation of jawboning and other government enforcement
methods.
II. A TAXONOMY OF GOVERNMENT PRESSURES AND
THEIR LEGITIMACY
This Part seeks to define when governmental pressures on
Internet platforms are, or are not, legitimate. First, it places
the Article’s argument in context by explaining why Internet
intermediaries are highly vulnerable to informal pressures
from state actors. Next, it builds a taxonomy of government
pressures along two dimensions: compulsion and authority.
Then, it offers two methodologiesone grounded in constitutional structure, the other in process-based approaches to governanceto assess the legitimacy of jawboning, and to explain
why this type of government action should be censured.
223. The Commission’s power to classify broadband as under, or outside,
Title II was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Nat’l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
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A. KNUCKLING UNDER
Internet platforms are the keystone species of the online
ecosystem, and like those species, they are vulnerable to pres224
sures. Platforms connect content creators with readers and
225
listeners. The power and weakness of Internet platforms is
that they are intermediaries. Unlike broadcast television stations and record labels of the twentieth century, Internet services carry predominantly if not exclusively content created by
226
others. They help to solve the problem of attention scarcity:
users with limited time must decide what drops to drink out of
227
a sea of content. Platforms’ choices, though, are of surpassing
importance. They determine what information is available, and
salient, for consumers. With Google search results, for example,
sites not listed on the first two pages rarely receive click228
throughs from users. Lower-ranked sites are less visible, and
229
unranked ones are effectively invisible. Accordingly, platform
decisions to remove or de-emphasize content have particular
force. Unfortunately, platforms are unusually vulnerable to
224. See Karl Gruber, Single Species May Be Key to Reef Health,
AUSTRALIAN GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.australiangeographic
.com.au/news/2014/09/single-keystone-species-may-be-key-to-reef-health;
L.
Scott Mills et al., The Keystone-Species Concept in Ecology and Conservation,
43 BIOSCIENCE 219, 219 (1993) (defining a keystone species as one whose
“presence is crucial in maintaining the organization and diversity of [its] ecological community” and that it is “exceptional, relative to the rest of the community, in [its] importance”).
225. See Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36
PEPP. L. REV. 427, 432 (2009).
226. Cf. Kreimer, supra note 57, at 16–18 (“Unable to reach those who originate or receive communications, official actors have sought to exert pressure
on intermediaries . . . .”).
227. See Michael H. Goldhaber, The Attention Economy and the Net, 2
FIRST MONDAY (1997), http://firstmonday.org/article/view/519/440.
228. While studies vary in precise details, nearly all show a powerful relationship between placement in Google’s search results and click-through rates
(the rate at which a search user clicks a given result). See, e.g., Danny Goodwin, Top Google Result Gets 36.4% of Clicks [Study], SEARCH ENGINE WATCH
(Apr. 21, 2011), http://searchenginewatch.com/sew/news/2049695/top-google
-result-gets-364-clicks-study (noting a study that found “ranking beyond Page
2 . . . has almost no business value”); Eric Siu, 24 Eye-Popping SEO Statistics,
SEARCH ENGINE J. (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.searchenginejournal.com/24
-eye-popping-seo-statistics/42665 (“[Seventy-five percent] of users never scroll
past the first page of search results.”).
229. See Barry Schwartz, A New Click Through Rate Study for Google Organic Results, MARKETING LAND (Oct. 1, 2014, 3:09 PM), http://www
.marketingland.com/new-click-rate-study-google-organic-results-102149;
see
also David Segal, The Dirty Little Secrets of Search, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/business/13search.html (discussing
J.C. Penney’s attempt to artificially increase its rank in Google search results).
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government pressures, both formal and informal.
Platforms’ gatekeeping function makes them a natural tar230
get for enforcement. It is far easier and more effective to impose controls upon an intermediary than upon a host of dispersed speakers who may be difficult to identify, located
231
outside the regulators’ jurisdiction, or judgment-proof. Platforms draw attention because government actors have scarce
resources too and want the greatest effect for a given investment in enforcement. Furthermore, online information by de232
fault does not follow geographic or jurisdictional boundaries.
A platform will typically be subject to the actions of an array of
regulators. For example, where state officials are empowered to
enforce intellectual property laws such as trade secret theft, intermediaries must expect to come under the supervision of
state attorneys general in addition to federal actors who en233
force copyright and anti-counterfeiting statutes.
Externalities also create skewed incentives for platforms.
Firms that host disfavored content reap little benefit, since any
single user or source generates but tiny revenue for the plat234
form. However, they face the full force of any legal liability or
235
public disapprobation that attends that material. The costbenefit calculus is clear: it makes sense to censor anything
236
questionable. The problem worsens with content that represents a minority viewpoint: the return from keeping it online is
further diminished, and appeals by government or dissatisfied
civil society groups may have greater appeal (and hence greater
237
cost to the platform) from the majority of users.
Moreover, platforms face a powerful information asymmetry that compounds the economic bias towards censorship.
They have far less information about whether content is lawful,
or disreputable, than the creator does, and investigation to gain
238
that knowledge can be costly at scale. Here, too, the cost230. See Kreimer, supra note 57, at 17.
231. See Mann & Belzley, supra note 55, at 259.
232. See Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, Personal Jurisdiction
and “teh Interwebs,” 100 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at
27).
233. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600A.035
(West 2015) (imposing criminal penalties for theft of trade secrets).
234. See Kreimer, supra note 57, at 28–29.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 29–30.
237. See id. at 28–29.
238. See id. at 69–70; cf. Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U.
PA. L. REV. 1011, 1035–36 (2014) (discussing information asymmetries for
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benefit analysis favors complying with pressures to remove
239
content rather than to resist or obtain more information.
Where the platform creates the content, it bears the full weight
of decisions to delete or promote it, but where others do so, it
only bears the marginal cost of that author’s favor or popularity
240
in doing so. This is especially true with minority viewpoints,
such as LGBT content, where hosting the material is likely nei241
ther profitable nor popular.
There might be a market niche for firms that vow to resist
242
jawboning. However, it is hard to credibly signal that commitment, particularly since firms effectively must comply with
some content removal requirements to stay within the ambit of
safe harbors for copyright infringement, trademark infringe243
ment, child pornography violations, and the like. It is possible
to generate such a signalRipoff Report has upheld its pledge
not to remove user-posted reviews, at the cost of considerable
244
litigationbut it is difficult.
The statutes and doctrinal developments protecting platforms that take sufficient precautions, such as removing content that allegedly infringes intellectual property rights upon
245
notification, are a two-edged sword. The safe harbors themselves relieve platforms from liability risk, but compliance with
them also demonstrates that intermediaries are capable of fil246
tering content. This creates a slippery slope: Internet services
that can remove content-infringing copyright upon notice can
247
defamapresumably also disable access to revenge porn,
248
249
250
251
tion, hate speech, pornography, threats, and other unproducers and consumers of software).
239. See Kreimer, supra note 57, at 28–30.
240. See id. at 38–41.
241. See id.
242. See Lichtman & Posner, supra note 55, at 241–43 (arguing that the
imposition of ISP liability is a desirable option despite the fact it may create
positive externalities).
243. See supra notes 84–86.
244. See, e.g., Small Justice L.L.C. v. Xcentric Ventures, No. 13-cv-11701,
2014 WL 1214828, at *9–10 (D. Mass. Mar. 24, 2014) (denying partially a motion to dismiss copyright claims based upon the Ripoff Report).
245. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012) (stating that service providers are not
liable for copyright infringments committed by their users if the service providers are unaware of the violations).
246. See also id.; 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2012).
247. See Franks, supra note 43, at 688–89.
248. See Anita Bernstein, Real Remedies for Virtual Injuries, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1457, 1485 (2012).
249. See Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate
Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV.
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savory material. As a legal matter, platforms can point to statutory and common law safe harbors as the reasons for their
removal of content, but refusing to filter other material becomes more difficult as a practical matter (they clearly have the
capabilities) and as a normative one (is copyright infringement
252
worse than hate speech?). In addition, some firms, such as
Google, engage in additional filtering. They remove child porn,
terrorism sites, and sensitive personal information from results, even though the law does not compel or encourage them
253
to do so. These voluntary efforts, while likely laudable, further limit platforms’ moral basis for refusing to engage in further removals.
Put crudely, Internet platforms face structural incentives
to knuckle under government jawboning over content.
B. A TAXONOMY OF PRESSURES
Government pressures can be usefully mapped along two
dimensions: authority and compulsion. This Article argues that
informal pressures on Internet platforms by government become problematic as the state’s actions increase in compulsion,
decrease in authority, or both. First, as the level of compulsion
of the state’s effort to influence the platform increases, that effort becomes more potentially problematic. The ends of the continuum are clear. At one pole, the state expresses its opinion or
position without consequenceit evinces a preference for how
the platform ought to behave, but its statements are hortato254
ry. At the other pole, the state’s views are backed by an overt
threat of action that will have material consequences for the
255
ISP. As the government’s command is backed by greater
force, it is more suspector, put another way, requires greater
justification.
Second, as the legal basis for the state’s actions becomes
less certain, those efforts become more potentially problematic.
1435, 1468–69 (2011).
250. See Preston, supra note 63.
251. See Citron & Norton, supra note 249.
252. See id. at 1453–54.
253. Google and Microsoft Agree to Steps To Block Abuse Images, BBC
NEWS (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-24980765; Removal Policies, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/2744324?hl=en
(last visited Oct. 14, 2015); Google Reveals “Terrorism Video” Removals, BBC
NEWS (June 17, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-18479137.
254. Speech may have negative reputational consequences, but like criticism of other varieties, that type of injury is not troublesome here.
255. See supra notes 21–27 and accompanying text.
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Here, too, the extremes of the spectrum are in clear focus.
When the state operates on the basis of clear legal authority, as
when the Environmental Protection Agency bargains with a
polluter who has violated the Clean Water Act, informal resolu256
tion is not only untroubling, but often desirable. And when
the state operates utterly without authority, as when law enforcement deliberately violates the rights of an innocent person,
257
those actions are ultra vires and undoubtedly illegitimate.
The middle range is challenging to map for both dimen258
sions. Any metric is vulnerable to question. However, the
principle that this taxonomy develops is important: the more
pressure the state applies, and the greater the stakes that accompany disobeying its wishes, the more those actions need
scrutiny and justification. As a given pressure from the state
involves greater compulsion and lesser authority, it is increasingly likely to constitute jawboning. Overall, the mapping looks
like so:

Authority
Formally
Specified

Compulsion
Government
Speech

Sanction
Jawboning
Absent

256. See Civil Cases and Settlements by Statute: Clean Water Act, U.S.
ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, http://cfpub.epa.gov/enforcement/cases/index.cfm (last
updated Oct. 1, 2015) (showing that the vast majority of Clean Water Act violations are decided informally).
257. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28–31 (1967) (reversing the dismissal
of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after finding defendant’s due process
rights were blatantly violated); see generally Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M.
Massaro, Outrageous and Irrational, 100 MINN. L. REV. 281 (2015).
258. See generally Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377,
411–17 (2009) [hereinafter Bambauer, Cybersieves] (describing multiple metrics).
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Figure 1 - Taxonomy of Pressures
Examples may helpfully illustrate the schematic above. In
the top right quadrant, the state is using well-defined regulatory authority to impose penalties, such as fines or incarceration,
upon targets who have notice of these potential sanctions to
guide their conduct. This set of activities represents, hopefully,
259
the vast majority of state enforcement pressures. Putting
aside concerns about the level of sanctions and the evenness of
enforcement, government action in this quadrant is conventional and desirable. And those potential problemsunduly
harsh penalties or discriminatory enforcementare mitigated
260
by constitutional doctrines such as equal protection, due pro261
262
cess, and the ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
The upper left quadrant denotes forbearance by the state.
Here, government can rely upon properly created and delineated authority, but decides to respond with less compulsory
measures. The state may be forced to rely on lesser methods
due to resource constraintsit is practically impossible to audit
every tax return, but the Internal Revenue Service can de263
nounce tax cheats at low cost. Or the government may decide
to use suasive rather than punitive measures as a matter of
policy, such as when the Obama administration decided not to
enforce federal controlled substance laws that ban marijuana in
264
states where the drug is legal under state law. This quadrant

259. See Noah, supra note 53, at 891–92 (discussing the use of consent decrees as a means of imposing penalties for statutory violations).
260. See generally United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465–66 (1996)
(discussing requirements to show selective prosecution based on race).
261. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that suppression
of evidence by the prosecuting attorney was a violation of due process).
262. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (ruling that imposing the
death penalty on minors is cruel and unusual punishment).
263. See, e.g., Chances of IRS Tax Audit Are Lowest in Years, CBS
MONEYWATCH (Apr. 13, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/chances-of-irs
-tax-audit-are-lowest-in-years (“Budget cuts and new responsibilities are
straining the Internal Revenue Service’s ability to police tax returns.”); AntiTax Law Evasion Schemes, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., (Oct. 24, 2014),
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Anti-Tax
-Law-Evasion-Schemes-Introduction (describing kit designed to “educate the
public about abusive tax avoidance schemes”).
264. Controlled Substance Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–89; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FROM JAMES M. COLE TO ALL U.S. ATTORNEYS (Aug. 29,
2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.
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describes government action that utilizes less stringent
measures than it is authorized to undertake.
The lower left quadrant is characterized by speech,
counterspeech, or wishful thinking. Here, the government is
employing measures that rely on prodding rather than penalties. President Obama’s criticism of Citizens United v. FEC at
his 2010 State of the Union address, with the members of the
265
Supreme Court in the audience, provides one exemplar. The
president has no power to alter the Court’s decisions about the
scope of the First Amendment, but he can upbraid the justices.
Non-binding congressional resolutions over the nation’s foreign
266
policy are another instance. State actions in this zone possess
both minimal authorization and minimal consequences. There
may be some risk of overreaction to governmental suasion here,
but that overreaction can be corrected with little concern for
repercussion.
The last type of pressure, found in the bottom right quadrant, is the most dangerous kind: it is where the state operates
by threatening or imposing penalties that lack grounding in
law. This is where jawboning resides. Examples of this type of
conduct are less infrequent than one would hope. A San Francisco police sergeant arrested a public defender in a courthouse
hallway for advising her client not to answer his questions; the
267
chief of police subsequently defended the sergeant’s actions.
President George W. Bush authorized the National Security
Agency to conduct surveillance on Americans’ international telephone calls and e-mail traffic without obtaining either a Title
III warrant or an order under the Foreign Intelligence Surveil268
lance Act. Boston police officers arrested a man who recorded
265. Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President in State of the
Union Address, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address; see Adam Liptak, A
Rare Rebuke, in Front of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, at A12.
266. See, e.g., Hill Challenges Reagan on Persian Gulf Policy, 43 CQ ALMANAC 252 (1987), http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal87-1144869 (discussing congressional efforts to pass a non-binding resolution delaying a Reaganled Persian Gulf policy).
267. See Alex Emslie, S.F. Police Chief: Arrested Public Defender Won’t Be
Charged, KQED (Feb. 5, 2015), http://ww2.kqed.org/news/2015/02/05/s-f-police
-chief-arrested-public-defender-wont-be-charged; Public Defender Attorney Arrested Last Week Says San Francisco Police Chief Apologized, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.mercurynews.com/crime-courts/ci_
27473625/public-defender-attorney-arrested-last-week-says-san.
268. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2012) (Wiretap Act warrant); 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)
(2012) (FISA order); see generally Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database
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them with his cell phone camera while they were punching a
269
man in the middle of Boston Common. Government officials
and agents do bad things sometimesthey act with force or
compulsion even when they clearly lack authority to do so.
Here is where the state’s actions are increasingly illegitimate;
they are not the product of legal authority, and hence are neither transparent nor accountable. The precise relationship between the variableshow decreasing authority and increasing
sanction interact to produce a given level of legitimacyis un270
clear. The mapping is a heuristic, not a mathematical plot.
Greater sanctions, when backed by questionable authority,
might be more legitimate than minor sanctions where a foundation in law is completely lacking, or the reverse might be
true. Regardless of the exact formula, legitimacy generally decreases as the state employs greater penalties and as its legal
foundation becomes less established.
This taxonomy usefully maps governmental pressures on
Internet platforms. Legitimacy will increase as the state’s authority is increasingly formally specified, such as in statutes,
binding judicial decisions, or properly-promulgated administrative regulations. The constraints of both formal rulemaking,
271
such as the Administrative Procedures Act, and judicial re272
view create accountability for regulators and push them to
specify permitted and proscribed conduct with sufficient narrowness.

of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY (May 11, 2006), http://usatoday30
.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm; James Risen & Eric
Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html.
269. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 85, 88 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding not only
that the arrest violated Simon Glik’s rights under the First and Fourth
Amendments, but that the officers involved were not entitled to qualified immunity, since those rights were clearly established).
270. Government actors might use lesser force or sanctions if they are
aware that the justification for their actions is in question, or they might use
greater force as a means of compensating psychologically. Cf. Brigham Daniels, When Agencies Go Nuclear: A Game Theoretic Approach to the Biggest
Sticks in an Agency’s Arsenal, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 442, 450, 454 (2012) (arguing that government agencies use threats of large regulatory penalties to
broadly influence the regulation landscape).
271. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596(e) (2012).
272. See generally Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984); SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194 (1947); Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952 (2007).
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Similarly, legitimacy rises as the strength of the enforcement sanction diminishes. The costs of error are simply lower,
and erroneous decisions on content restrictions impose real
273
harms. Since no process of review is perfect, some errors will
persist, thus sacrificing accountability for those incorrectly tar274
geted. There are also costs to underenforcement, but this
275
scale is a relative measure. Legitimacy regarding compulsion
can be thought of as analogous to the rule of lenity in criminal
law: when comparing sanctions in a given case, the one mar276
ginally less severe is likely to be more legitimate.
Regulation by the state can be helpfully categorized based
on specification of authority and level of compulsion. Where authority is vague and compulsion is high, the government is engaged in jawboning.
C. ASSESSING LEGITIMACY
Assessing the legitimacy of government actions to regulate
information is challenging, but there are at least two different
methodologies that indicate jawboning does not pass muster.
The first looks to the jurisprudence and norms around the First
Amendment. The second employs a process-based framework
used to evaluate governance of online censorship. Both find
that jawboning tends to lack legitimacy.
1. First Amendment Limits and Values
The First Amendment is both a substantive source of restrictions upon governmental action and an expression of deep277
ly-held societal values. Both as doctrine and norm, the First
Amendment means that the United States treats speech regulations differently than other legal rulesin particular, re278
gimes that limit speech are generally viewed with skepticism.
273. See Kreimer, supra note 57, at 27–33.
274. See id.
275. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 258, at 396–99.
276. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (stating that ambiguous criminal statutes “should be resolved in favor of lenity”). See generally
Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
885 (2004); Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420 (2006).
277. See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2368 (2000).
278. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The
First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories
of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.
The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that
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279

When government regulates optometrists or teeth whiten280
281
ing or casket sales, its efforts enjoy almost complete deference from judicial review. Only the most blatantly irrational
282
decisions are subject to reversal. By contrast, laws directed at
speech generally draw heightened scrutiny, and regulations
aimed at specific content face strict scrutiny and near-certain
283
invalidation. Federal and state governments alike have found
clever means to circumvent the restrictions that the First
Amendment places upon their abilities to regulate speech because of its content, from funding to the use of putatively unre284
lated laws to a range of informal pressures. Those workarounds, however, drive home the point: the background legal
rule and societal norm is that government regulation of speech
is presumptively suspect. A second-order result of this presumption against speech regulation is that rules restricting
content must be relatively clear and well-defined. Ambiguity in
what material falls within a rule’s proscription is usually fa285
tal.
The First Amendment importantly constrains the powers
of the state. The federal government is not only an organ of
enumerated and limited powers, but it must exercise those
286
powers subject to the First Amendment’s dictates. This approach, exemplified by the work of Philip Hamburger, treats
the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.”).
279. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
280. See N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015); see Adam Liptak, Regulatory Case in North Carolina Appears To Trouble Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2014, at A24.
281. See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013).
282. See id. at 226; see Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 257 (discussing
outrageous and irrational government conduct).
283. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (“Because the [challenged] Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected
speech, it is invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict
scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government interest
and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”). See generally United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There may be narrower
scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such
as those of the first ten amendments . . . .”).
284. See Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, supra note 58.
285. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870–74 (1997).
286. See Philip Hamburger, Getting Permission, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 405,
416–20 (2007) (arguing that licensing speech and the press “dispossesses an
independent people of their individual authority and renders them subservient”).
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the Amendment principally as a check upon government rather
287
than as an individual entitlement conferred upon citizens.
Constraining the government’s ability to regulate speech is useful, and desirable, even if no one speaks. The distinction between limit and entitlement is that individual entitlements can
be reallocated as the holders think best, but limits have been
288
societally determined and cannot be unilaterally shifted. This
approach suggests that governmental attempts to exceed those
limits are not legitimate, even if they escape constitutional
289
sanction by reviewing courts.
First Amendment doctrine has at times been attentive to
informal and indirect regulations of speech. For example, the
Supreme Court invalidated a Minnesota tax on paper and ink
290
used in publishing newspapers. The Court noted that the tax
291
singled out the press for specialand negativetreatment.
Moreover, the sizable exemption built into the tax code meant
that only a few Minnesota publishers were effectively subject to
the levy; the state seemed to have targeted a subgroup of the
292
press. The Court dealt similarly with a Louisiana tax on
newspapers with circulation greater than 20,000 copies per
293
week, and with an Arkansas sales tax scheme that exempted
294
magazines on certain subjects.
Skepticism about informal modes of enforcement goes beyond taxation. Rhode Island set up a “Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth” to review publications for obscenity and
295
indecency. When the Commission determined that a piece of
printed matter was not suitable for consumption by minors, it

287. See Hamburger, supra note 58, at 484; Hamburger, supra note 286;
Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards, 2004
SUP. CT. REV. 271, 276–81 (2004) [hereinafter Hamburger, Censorship].
288. Hamburger, supra note 58, at 484 (“[C]onstitutional rights are communally imposed legal limits, and the federal government therefore cannot
free itself from these limits by making side deals with private or state actors.”).
289. Hamburger, Censorship, supra note 287. See generally Bambauer,
Orwell’s Armchair, supra note 58 (discussing censorship methods available to
U.S. governments despite First Amendment restrictions).
290. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575, 579 (1983).
291. Id. at 582–83.
292. Id. at 591–92.
293. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 251 (1936).
294. Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227–34 (1987).
295. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 59–60 (1963).
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would notify distributors by letter, asking for their cooperation
296
in removing the material from circulation. While the Commission itself lacked enforcement power, its letters invariably
noted that the body could suggest targets for prosecution to the
297
Attorney General. The Supreme Court invalidated the statute establishing the Commission, noting that “informal censorship may sufficiently inhibit the circulation of publications to
298
warrant injunctive relief.” The Court’s admonition that “freedoms of expression must be ringed about with adequate bul299
warks”
has led to the development of buffer zones even
300
301
around unprotected content such as defamation, obscenity,
302
and incitement. These cases suggest that the Court patrols,
at least occasionally, for indirect means of regulating speech.
The doctrine and norms of the First Amendment suggest
why jawboning is particularly problematic in the context of Internet information: state actions that would be unexceptional
303
in other contexts can be illegitimate when they touch speech.
The Constitution sets the default for efforts to regulate information: governments must justify their attempts to do so. They
routinely overreach with speech-related laws and rules; indeed,
the recent history of Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence is a rogue’s gallery of popular yet unconstitutional
304
legislation. Private bargains over information take place un296. See id. at 61–64.
297. See id. at 62–63.
298. Id. at 67.
299. Id. at 66.
300. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 727 (1964); cf. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (prohibiting the award of damages to
public figures for intentional infliction of emotional distress unless done with
actual malice).
301. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (“[T]he mere private
possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime.”).
302. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (invalidating an ordinance on the grounds that “it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on
the basis of the subjects the speech addresses”).
303. See Hamburger, Censorship, supra note 287, at 313–21.
304. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735 (2011) (invalidating a California law forbidding retailers from selling violent video
games to minors); Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2669 (2011) (invalidating a Vermont statute controlling the use of pharmacy records); U.S. v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (invalidating a federal law that criminalized
the possession or sale of depictions of animal cruelty); cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 562
U.S. 443, 458–59 (2011) (holding that the First Amendment protected picketing at a soldier’s funeral). See generally Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional Freedom—The Roberts Court, the First Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76
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der circumstances lacking not only judicial review, but also the
constraints and trade-offs of the legislative or administrative
rulemaking processes. Attempts to regulate speech often fail
during the legislative or administrative agency process, and
305
when they succeed, they face a skeptical judiciary. State actors are likely to reach for more than they can grasp through
formal modes of enforcement.
Put simply, America worries about governmental restrictions on speech. The country has a deeply-held normative
conviction that speech regulation ought to pass through the
crucible of democratic processes and judicial review. We should
be suspicious when government seeks to obtain results from
private bargains that would be uncertain at best through formal public processes, from parties structurally inclined to concede the point.
2. Process and Information Restrictions
The second approach to assessing legitimacy is to examine
the process by which the restriction is generated. In prior
306
307
works, I elucidated and applied a methodology for normative judgments of online censorship, focusing on whether the
decisions to censor are open, transparent, narrowly targeted,
308
and accountable. This formula can be used to evaluate informal government pressures as well as formal rules; indeed,
many systems of online control depend upon a blend of public
309
and private efforts. This Article now employs the processbased framework to compare informal methods of altering platforms’ content decisions to more formal mechanisms.

ALB. L. REV. 409 (2013) (discussing recent cases).
305. See supra note 70 and accompanying text; PROTECT IP Act of 2011,
S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011); Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong.
(2011).
306. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 258.
307. See generally Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, supra note 58; Derek E.
Bambauer, Filtering in Oz: Australia’s Foray into Internet Censorship, 31 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 493 (2009).
308. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 258, at 390–409.
309. See, e.g., China, OPENNET INITIATIVE (Aug. 9, 2012), https://access
.opennet.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/accesscontested-china.pdf;
Duncan
Geere, Cameron’s Proposed Filters Extend to More than Just Porn, WIRED
(July 27, 2013); http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-07/27/pornwall;
Laurie Penny, David Cameron’s Internet Porn Filter Is the Start of Censorship
Creep, GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2014/jan/03/david-cameron-internet-porn-filter-censorship-creep.
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Openness varies: the government discloses some jawboning
publicly, but pressures often begin (and sometimes remain) be310
hind closed doors. The concern regarding openness is strategic behaviorregulators will tend to keep their efforts quiet
when it suits their interests, and to trumpet them when they
wish to add public pressure to their schemes. At minimum,
jawboning is inherently less open than formal rulemaking
through legislation, adjudication, or administrative proce311
dure. In addition, regulators disclose informal efforts intermittently at best. Relative to more formal mechanisms, jawboning fares poorly on the openness criterion.
The transparency analysis is similar to that for openness.
Transparency measures whether regulators are clear about
what content is proscribed, in addition to whether content restrictions should be put in place (which is measured by open312
ness). While the level of transparency will vary with the specifics of the governmental effort, there is no reason to think
that requests to remove, for example, material that infringes
copyright or that constitutes child pornography will be less specific and comprehensible to platforms than formal regulations
313
that so specify.
Generally, more formal means are more
314
transparent, because informal statements may be ephemeral.
Here, though, the relationship between regulator and regulated
diminishes that concern. Where there is uncertainty, platforms
can likely seek informal assistance from regulators, who are
likely to clarify areas of uncertainty; this method may be superior from a cost perspective. Thus, for transparency, jawboning
does not seem worse than formal regulation, and it may have
some advantages.

310. Compare supra Part I.B (describing open jawboning of Backpage.com),
with supra Part I.D (describing closed negotiations over Six Strikes).
311. Cf. Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 258, at 390 (“[C]ensorship that
is clearly disclosed and carefully explained is more likely to be legitimate,
[while] censorship that is covert, or that rests on flimsy pretexts, is less acceptable.”).
312. See id. at 393.
313. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2258 (2012).
314. Cf. Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 258, at 394–95 (“States can
disclose what material they block either formally, such as through codification
in press regulations, or informally, such as in statements by government officials. Formal criteria are more transparent; citizens have greater access to
documented rules than to oral utterances.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Jawboning is unlikely to target proscribed content narrow315
ly. In theory, informal pressures could carefully concentrate
only upon unlawful material. If they aim only at content designated as illegal through legitimate procedures, these efforts are
less likely to be problematic. While there is the problem of
underinclusive enforcement, the government can choose to
316
start by tackling part of the issue. Regulators may be less
likely to use informal means to pursue unlawful content, in
part because they generally do not need to. However, governments may decide to apply pressure to platforms even when the
content is not unlawful as to the firms (rather than their us317
ers). Jawboning is thus wide in practice, even if narrow in
theory.
The largest legitimacy challenge for jawboning is account318
ability. In the United States, all government officials are ultimately accountable to the polity, though varying levels of ef319
fort are required to remove them.
The accountability
analysis, though, is more subtle than merely probing for
320
whether constituents vote for their officials. Citizens’ power
315. See id. at 397–99 (explaining that filtering may be overinclusive,
underinclusive, or a combination of both, depending on the content).
316. There remain salient constitutional limits on partial enforcement. For
example, the government may not target only obscene speech produced by
Democrats. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–89 (1992). The
Supreme Court, in R.A.V., rejected the notion that its approach banned
underinclusiveness, rather than content discrimination. Id. at 387. Perhaps
the more accurate description is that the Court limits the reasons why content
regulation, even of expression that the state may proscribe, can be
underinclusive.
317. See generally Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings L.L.C., 755 F.3d
398, 407–08 (6th Cir. 2014); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners
L.L.C., 718 F.3d 1006, 1011–14 (9th Cir. 2013); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube,
Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 26–28 (2d Cir. 2012); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d
465, 470–71 (3d Cir. 2003).
318. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 258, at 400–01.
319. For example, a sitting President may hold office only for a maximum
of ten years (if re-elected twice, and initially serving half of the prior President’s term), whereas Article III federal judges hold their positions for life
(technically, during “good Behavior”). U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1, cl. 1 (“No
person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no
person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more
than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President
shall be elected to the office of the President more than once.”); U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 1, cl. 2 (“Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behavior . . . .”).
320. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 258, at 402–04 (describing
problems of accountability in countries lacking citizen participation and accountability failures in democracies).
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322

to elect their government may be transitory or illusory ; in a
federal system, a regulator in one state may take action with
spillover effects into other states, where residents cannot force
323
the regulator to feel their disapprobation. The accountability
analysis incorporates four parts: first, democratic participation;
second, specification of authority; third, opportunity to chal324
lenge; and fourth, countermajoritarian constraints. In the
U.S., jawboning passes muster on the firststate actors are
elected, or report to those who have beenbut falters on the
others. The second piece of the accountability test measures
whether the state’s legal authority to demand removal or alter325
ation of content is clearly delineated. Express selection of
content still may not be sufficiently precise, such as with statutes prohibiting online services from making indecent material
326
available to minors. Overly broad proscriptions can enable
regulators to pursue violators arbitrarily or as pretext for other
327
motives.
The opportunity to challenge is, formally, likely to be pre328
sent in nearly all contexts. However, the challenge itself
comes at a cost. At minimum, the platform contesting informal
329
efforts has to invest time and resources. Lawyers are not
cheap. Further, the switch to formal mechanisms, such as a
321. See id. at 402 (using the example of Thailand, where coups have repeatedly displaced elected governments).
322. See id. at 402–03 (noting that Russia and Zimbabwe have the procedural trappings but not the substance of democratic participation); FREEDOM
HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2014: THE DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP GAP
21–22 (2014), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202014%20
Scores%20-%20Countries%20and%20Territories.pdf (designating Russia and
Zimbabwe as “Not Free”).
323. See, e.g., Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 258, at 403 (describing
how New York’s Attorney General pressured ISPs into dropping Usenet service for all of the providers’ customers, not just those in New York).
324. Id. at 400–01.
325. Id. at 404–06.
326. See, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 859, 874–75
(1997) (invalidating 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), which created criminal penalties for
allowing telecommunications facility to be used to transmit indecent material).
327. See id. at 871–72. See generally Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note
258, at 405 (noting Singapore’s use of broad definitions of prohibited content to
selectively ban popular gay and lesbian sites).
328. See Kreimer, supra note 57, at 31–32 (“[E]fforts to generate proxy censorship by targeting intermediaries are less likely to be challenged in court
than censorship efforts directed at speakers or listeners, and are therefore
more likely to be consciously manipulated to suppress protected speech.”).
329. See id.
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lawsuit, is virtually certain to draw publicity. As Tim Wu notes,
330
sometimes publicity itself is punishment. Going public can
draw in other parties, either those with affected interests or
331
those acting opportunistically. For the regulator, part of the
benefit of jawboning is that it transfers much of the costs of enforcement to the target entity; rather than engaging in expensive rulemaking or adjudication, the government can persuade
or threaten, and force the target to seek recourse through more
332
costly channels. Companies do occasionally stand up to the
regulator on principle. For example, Yahoo! challenged a gag
order contained in a subpoena for information on one of its us333
ers in federal court. The government sought to keep Yahoo!
from informing the user indefinitely, rather than for the usual
334
60- or 90-day limit.
The Internet firm’s successful effort
meant that it could tell the user they were under investigationvaluable to that person, but only minimally so to the
335
company. While Yahoo! likely earned reputational benefit in
some circles, it is difficult to believe the bump in prestige would
336
offset the costs. Again, platforms are unlikely to internalize
the benefits of a challenge, in the same way that some of the
costs of regulation fall upon users rather than the firm. Thus,
even though regulated parties do possess the power to chal337
lenge jawboning, they will often be deterred from doing so.
330. Wu, supra note 49, at 1856.
331. For example, Google’s challenge to Mississippi Attorney General Jim
Hood’s subpoena drew a range of amicus briefs from groups on both sides of
the issue, including the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Digital Citizens Alliance, and the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition. Ernesto, Google
Chrome Dragged into Internet Censorship Fight, TORRENTFREAK (Feb. 5,
2015),
http://torrentfreak.com/google-chrome-dragged-internet-censorship
-fight-150205.
332. See Memorandum of Law, supra note 18, at 8–13 (describing the Attorney General’s threats which caused Google Inc. to seek recourse through
the courts); Mullin, supra note 10; Sales, supra note 27.
333. Order Denying Motion Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), In re Grand
Jury Subpoena for: [Redacted]@yahoo.com, No. 5:15-xr-90096-PSG (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 5, 2015).
334. Id. at *1.
335. See Caroline Simson, US Bid for Unending Yahoo Gag Order Rejected
by Judge, LAW360 (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/619364/us
-bid-for-unending-yahoo-gag-order-rejected-by-judge (noting decision subject to
re-filing by government for shorter period of non-disclosure).
336. See Google, Yahoo, Facebook and Microsoft Push Back on Surveillance
Gag Orders, RT (May 24, 2014), http://www.rt.com/usa/161192-google
-facebook-microsoft-nsa-gag.
337. See Noah, supra note 53. For example, only two firms have challenged
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The last prong in the accountability analysis tests whether
there are countermajoritarian constraints on censorship deci338
sions. As with opportunity to challenge, those constraints are
formally present via judicial challenge to jawboning, among
other options. But the initial interaction lacks direct constraintsregulators are either elected or answer to elected officials. They have few incentives to consider minority viewpoints,
so long as those viewpoints are not those of powerful interest
339
groups.
Informal
enforcement will
generally
lack
countermajoritarian constraints, since there is no neutral arbiteronly the regulator and the regulated. Moreover, procedural hurdles—including doctrines such as standing and ripeness—may limit targets’ ability to challenge informal
enforcement, thereby obviating the role of courts as a
340
countermajoritarian check.
When comparing more formal modes of enforcement to less
formal ones, both the process-based approach and the constitutional structure and values approach manifest a distinct preference for the formal. Formal mechanisms are generally more
open and accountable, and better comport with America’s
structural reluctance to countenance speech restrictions.
III. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

341

If jawboning is both illegitimate and sufficiently widespread to warrant remediation, what is to be done? This Part

the FTC’s efforts to force compliance with their privacy and security norms,
even though the settlements that all other firms agree to impose significant
monitoring obligations as well as financial penalties. LabMD v. Fed. Trade
Comm’n, No. 14-12144 (11th Cir. 2015), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/cases/d09351labmdappealorder_0.pdf; Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Wyndham Worldwide, No. 13-cv-1887 (ES) (D.N.J. 2014). Only three enforcement actions to date have failed to end in settlement. Daniel J. Solove &
Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 611–12 (2014).
338. Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 258, at 408.
339. See supra notes 6–19 (noting that Hollywood content companies are a
minority interest group, but that they are not a powerless group).
340. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014) (finding
case ripe for adjudication); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013)
(denying standing). See generally Nicholas Quinn Rosencranz, The Subjects of
the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209 (2010) (discussing ripeness and standing as prerequisites to judicial review).
341. With apologies to Leo Tolstoy. LEO TOLSTOY, WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
(English ed. 1887).
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reviews first the considerable challenges to cabining jawboning.
Then, it explores and evaluates the options to do so.
A. CHALLENGES
Jawboning is difficult to constrain for a variety of reasons.
First, government can effectively threaten platforms even when
its underlying legal authority is unclear, or its capability to obtain such authority in the future is uncertain. Firms must bear
the costs of clarifying the scope of the state’s power, either by
challenging it or by incurring risk of future, formal enforcement. Even if the state actor lacks authority at present, she
could seek it through rulemaking or legislation, leaving the
target in an even worse position since the ambiguity would
342
vanish. For the regulated, predicting whether a regulator has
343
the political clout to obtain new authority is risky business.
Even efforts likely to fail may force firms to expend resources in
lobbying against them, just to be certain of the outcome. In
short, the state uses the cost calculus of uncertainty and transactional expenses to push firms to comply.
Second, platforms may lack incentives to try to cabin jaw344
boning. A platform that resists pressure creates, in effect, a
public goodclarifying the scope of governmental authoritybut it captures only a small fraction of the benefit of that
345
good, leading to underproduction. Firms may also have stra346
tegic reasons to favor, even subtly, jawboning. Close relationships with regulators may mean that the informal guidance
342. Network neutrality provides one example. The FCC began by jawboning, and eventually reclassified broadband Internet as subject to common carrier regulation. FCC, FCC ADOPTS STRONG, SUSTAINABLE RULES TO PROTECT
THE OPEN INTERNET (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-adopts
-strong-sustainable-rules-protect-open-internet.
343. For example, network neutrality rules were viewed as unlikely to
pass, while SOPA and PROTECT IP appeared to be safe bets to be enacted.
See Tim Wu, Why Everyone Was Wrong About Net Neutrality, NEW YORKER
(Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/why-everyone
-was-wrong-about-net-neutrality; see also Grant Gross, Lawmakers Seem Intent on Approving SOPA, PIPA, PCWORLD (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.pcworld
.com/article/247339/lawmakers_seem_intent_on_approving_sopa_pipa.html.
344. See Kreimer, supra note 57.
345. See id. at 31–32.
346. Wu, supra note 49, at 1843 (“[B]oth industry and agency may sometimes prefer unenforceable rules and a lack of judicial involvement. . . . The
costs of a slow-moving, ossified rulemaking or adjudicatory procedure, with its
accompanying uncertainty and litigation costs, fall on both industry and agency.”).
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needed to comply is more readily available to existing firms
than to new market entrants. The sheer opacity of enforcement
can helpfully create barriers to entryand thus competition.
Third, jawboning operates offstage and is hard to detect.
Government frequently operates in privatebehind closed
doors, where countervailing forces and pressures are exclud347
ed. A lack of transparency impedes efforts to check jawbon348
ing. It may be hard to determine the frequency with which it
is employed. The state may credibly threaten greater or addi349
tional penalties if the target reveals government pressure.
The federal government has not hesitated to employ this type
of leverage. For example, when the telecommunications firm
Qwest refused the National Security Agency’s request to provide phone records without a warrant, the government alleged350
ly withdrew contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
Conversely, the government can go public with its concerns
351
with virtually no fear of penalty. Moreover, public enforcers
may engage in misdirection. They may lie. Project Goliath supplies a cogent example: Attorney General Hood sought to pressure Google under the guise of concern over trafficking in illegal pharmaceuticals, pornography, and stolen credit cards,
when his real rationale was Hollywood’s loathing of copyright
352
infringement. His true motivation came to light only when
347. See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885,
934 (2006) (“[A]gencies that face avoidable openness requirements may operate in the ways transparency theory anticipates, by disclosing what they must
while keeping secret that which is best left undisclosed . . . .”).
348. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1339, 1347–48 (discussing transparency as regulation).
349. See Order Denying Motion Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), In re
Grand Jury Subpoena for: [Redacted]@yahoo.com, No. 5:15-xr-90096-PSG
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2015) (rejecting government’s motion to prevent Yahoo! from
disclosing grand jury subpoena for indefinite period on First Amendment
grounds); Kim Zetter, “John Doe” Who Fought FBI Spying Freed from Gag Order After 6 Years, WIRED (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.wired.com/2010/08/nsl
-gag-order-lifted (describing ISP owner who fought gag order regarding National Security Letter, and noting that “the letter’s gag order ‘was totally clear
that they were saying that I couldn’t speak to a lawyer’”).
350. Ellen Nakashima & Dan Eggen, Former CEO Says U.S. Punished
Phone Firm; Qwest Feared NSA Plan Was Illegal, Filing Says, WASH. POST,
Oct. 13, 2007, at A1.
351. See Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
311, 331–33, 338–44 (2011) (describing informal government pressures on
Wikileaks).
352. See Wingfield & Lipton, supra note 14.
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the Sony Pictures hack caused a trove of e-mail messages about
353
Project Goliath to emerge. This misdirection lets government
optimize its rationale for intervention, even when that rationale is less than the truth.
Fourth, the primary source of checks on the elected
branchesjudicial interventionis dramatically limited by
doctrine. Targets of jawboning may have trouble proving standing under Article III, since it may be hard to demonstrate sufficient fear of enforcement from informal demands and discus354
sions. Similarly, remedies are challengingcourts may be
reluctant to intervene in the operations of their co-equal
branches. In particular, judges may be chary of enjoining what
appears to be government speecha category of expression
355
nearly free of constitutional limitations. The boundary between threats and speech is hard enough to divine when dealing with private actors; with government, it is yet more diffi356
cult. Targets of jawboning may be trapped in a paradox:
facing enough risk of enforcement to prompt action, but not
357
enough to trigger judicial review.
Lastly, there may be risks of second-order jawboning in
some cases. For example, Internet firms that do business with
353. See Adi Robertson, Google Condemns Hollywood’s Secret Anti-Piracy
Program, VERGE (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.theverge.com/2014/12/18/
7417891/google-condemns-sony-project-goliath.
354. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2342, 2344
(2014) (allowing “pre-enforcement review under circumstances that render the
threatened enforcement sufficiently imminent” and requiring that the conduct
be arguably forbidden by the challenged statute).
355. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct.
2239, 2245 (2015) (“When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free
Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says.” (citing Pleasant
Grove v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009))); Pleasant Grove v.
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (“The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government
speech.”). But see Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 648, 650 (2013) (arguing “that in fact the Constitution properly imposes a
broad principle of government nonendorsement”) .
356. See Gia Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 983, 1005–08 (2005) (explaining that government communications are becoming less transparent because of the developments in technology
and society).
357. State courts, of course, are not bound by Article III’s limitations and
could, consistent with their own constitutional and statutory limits, intervene
earlier. For example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court propounded
an advisory opinion on civil unions in response to a request from the state’s
legislature. In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass.
2004).
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the government may be motivated to respond to state preferences, or risk seemingly unconnected penalties in contracting.
Or, principal-agent divergence may cause problems. A number
of top executives at companies such as Google and Twitter have
moved between the government and the private sector, particu358
larly in the Obama administration. Others may be motivated
to nudge their firms to comply so as to remain viable candidates for government jobs. This possibility requires a signaling
mechanismthe target must know about the causal link between lack of compliance and the seemingly unrelated penaltybut repeated interactions over time may provide the necessary clues.
These barriers to resisting jawboning only serve to reinforce the power of the tactic against platforms. Regulators can
use threats and other informal enforcement tools to prod recalcitrant Internet firms, knowing that structural factors push
towards compliance. The next Section examines options to shift
this calculus.
B. PARTIAL REMEDIES
With these challenges in mind, four possibilities bear consideration: changing legal doctrine to alter jawboning, using
reputational rewards and sanctions, encouraging transparency,
and framing the practice as illegitimate.

358. See Cecilia Kang & Juliet Eilperin, Why Silicon Valley Is the New Revolving Door for Obama Staffers, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2015), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/as-obama-nears-close-of-his-tenure
-commitment-to-silicon-valley-is-clear/2015/02/27/3bee8088-bc8e-11e4-bdfa
-b8e8f594e6ee_story.html. For example, Andrew McLaughlin moved from
Google to the Obama administration to Digg. About Andrew, ANDREW
MCLAUGHLIN, http://andrew.mclaughl.in/about-me (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
Former White House Chief Technology Officer Aneesh Chopra started a data
analytics firm. Steven Overly, Aneesh Chopra, the Nation’s First Chief Technology Officer, Has Started a New Venture, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/aneesh-chopra-the-nations
-first-chief-technology-officer-has-started-a-new-venture/2014/03/21/51e20d3a
-afa4-11e3-9627-c65021d6d572_story.html. David Kappos was nominated to
join the Obama administration as head of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office from IBM. Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Announces
More Key Administration Posts, WHITE HOUSE (June 18, 2009), http://www
.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/President-Obama-Announces-More-Key
-Administration-Posts-6-18-09.
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1. Limits Through Law
One could attempt to limit jawboning through law. This
would build on the extant, though scanty, constitutional protections for platforms that might bar at least some jawboning. The
unconstitutional conditions doctrine limits the bargains government can strike when it demands the surrender of one con359
stitutional right to obtain a benefit. The doctrine likely constrains informal pressures well at the edgeswhen the state
demands a decision about content without any legal authority
360
to regulate that content. That looks like duress, or a onesided bargain: government gains a benefit without surrender361
ing anything. With Project Goliath, this analysis is straightforward. The state attorneys general have nothing to trade for
Google’s compliance with their demands. With data retention,
the calculus is harderit’s not at all clear that the government’s threat to seek legislation mandating records retention is
362
a nullity. However, in anything but edge cases, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is an enigma wrapped in a mysteryits boundaries, terms, and justifications are uncertain at

359. Compare Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, 133 S. Ct.
2321 (2013) (rejecting the condition for international aid funding that required
opposition to prostitution), and Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist.,
133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (rejecting government demand for an easement and offsetting wetland improvements in exchange for development permit), with
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (upholding the requirement that libraries and schools instill filters on Internet-connected computers to obtain government-subsidized broadband access), and Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (upholding the
requirement that entities refrain from lobbying in order to maintain taxexempt status).
360. Cf. Hamburger, supra note 58, at 480 (“[C]onsent is irrelevant for conditions that go beyond the government’s power.”).
361. See Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional
Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 943 (2006) (“Judicial review of the qualitative match between the two sides of a bargain has no
counterpart in contract law. This suggests that the motivating concerns are
quite different than those relating to ordinary markets, such as preventing
duress.”). But see Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions Everywhere: The Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 61, 65 (2013) (“Deal-making is
ordinarily a good thing, even if the situation seems like ‘a choice between the
rock and the whirlpool.’” (quoting Michigan P.U.C. v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570, 593
(1925))).
362. Data retention is already statutorily required in some industries, including the securities industry and health care industry. See Derek E.
Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584, 641–42 (2011).
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363

best and arbitrary at worst. It is not clear when the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is triggered, nor what methodology
364
courts use to resolve cases when it is. This aspect of constitutional law cannot reliably check jawboning.
Other legal options founder on practical considerations.
Regulators could simply forbear from employing jawboning, but
that disposes of the problem via wishful thinking. Congress
could limit the executive’s scope of freedom by imposing statutory constraints, as it has done with the Federal Trade Com365
mission (FTC)
and Environmental Protection Agency
366
(EPA).
This would narrow, but not eliminate, executive
branch enforcement. For example, despite the significant limitations on its substantive rulemaking authority, the FTC has
effectively become the chief privacy regulator for the U.S., establishing a pattern of settlements that constitute a type of
367
common law for the area. And this possibility assumes that
Congress wants to check executive jawboning, which was not

363. See Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, supra note 58, at 917 (arguing that
the logic of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is unclear and that courts
engage in guesswork when utilizing the doctrine); Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 11 (1988) (“The [academic literature] sensibly recognizes the essential
place that the [unconstitutional conditions] doctrine occupies in modern constitutional law, but it makes far less sense when it attempts to explain how
the doctrine arises or what it does.”); Hamburger, supra note 58, at 487–88
(describing how case law is confusing because courts reach decisions before
fully understanding the issue).
364. Cox & Samaha, supra note 361, at 67 (“[A]n amusing aspect of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is that there is no doctrine . . . there is no
snappy and established test for analyzing unconstitutional conditions questions.”).
365. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2012) (limiting the FTC’s authority to prescribe rules
and general statements of policy). Congress moved to limit the FTC’s substantive rulemaking authority in 1975 with the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
hemming in the agency with a set of baroque procedural requirements. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-637, § 202, 88 Stat. 2183, 2193 (1975).
366. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2012). The Environmental Protection Agency
must consider “energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs”
when determining what constitutes the best available control technology
mandated by the Clean Air Act.
367. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 337, at 585–86 (explaining how FTC
jurisprudence is the “broadest and most influential regulating force on information privacy” and that companies analyze the settlement agreements to
guide their decisions). But see Justin Hurwitz, Data Security and the FTC’s
UnCommon Law, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 20) (on file
with author) (arguing that the FTC’s discretion to select cases it will hear is a
“clear departure from the common law”).
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the case in the data retention debate at least. The executive
branch could impose its own internal controls on informal enforcement. For example, the Department of Justice requires
that U.S. Attorneys obtain approval from designated senior officials, such as the Associate Attorney General, before entering
369
into bargains allowing pleas of nolo contendere. However, the
executive is not likely to limit significantly its own enforcement
powers and discretion. This option, too, assumes the problem
away. Put simply, the political branches find jawboning too
easy, attractive, and powerful to impose meaningful internal or
interbranch checks on the practice. And, the demands of the
modern administrative state make regulators wary of limiting
370
informal enforcement.
2. Reputational Consequences
A second possibility is for private entities such as consumers and civil society groups to generate approbation for platform resistance to jawboning, and disapprobation for acquiescence. They should applaud Google when the firm keeps videos
of police brutality on its YouTube site despite government pressure, and decry the search engine when it takes down offensive
371
films based upon it. Increasing the reputational consequences
to firms based on their decisions about whether to submit to
jawboning seem initially to have the moral calculus backwardsa form of blaming the victim. However, this method
constrains government from a different angle. Firms will inevitably vary with how pliant they are in responding to informal
368. See supra Part I.D.
369. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, APPROVAL REQUIRED FOR CONSENT TO PLEA OF NOLO CONTENDERE § 9-16.010 (2008), http://
www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-16000-pleas-federal-rule-criminal-procedure
-11#9-16.010.
370. See Wu, supra note 49, at 1842 (contending that threats are useful
since the alternatives are ignoring issues or making laws without a sufficient
factual record).
371. Compare Rebecca J. Rosen, What To Make of Google’s Decision To
Block the “Innocence of Muslims” Movie, ATLANTIC (Sept. 14, 2012), http://
www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/09/what-to-make-of-googles
-decision-to-block-the-innocence-of-muslims-movie/262395 (suggesting that
pressure from the Obama administration contributed to Google’s removal of
the film), with Rebecca J. Rosen, Google Refuses To Remove Police-Brutality
Videos, ATLANTIC (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2011/10/google-refuses-to-remove-police-brutality-videos/247462 (uncovering that Google generally removes content only when receiving court orders declaring content as defamatory).
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state pressures. For example, under the administration of President George W. Bush, the National Security Agency sought to
obtain American citizens’ telephone records from telecommuni372
cations companies without a warrant. AT&T, Verizon, and
373
374
BellSouth readily complied. Qwest refused. Imposing reputational consequences for those decisions would reward Qwest,
relative to its competitors, for resisting jawboning to undertake
illegal action.
Rewarding or punishing firms for resisting (or acquiescing
to) jawboning would have at least two salutary effects. First, it
can generate a market-based returnor penaltythat helps
platform companies internalize the effects of their decisions.
This could shift, though perhaps only partially, the structural
incentives that lead intermediaries to comply so readily with
informal measures. There is some evidence that this occurs
when companies take inadequate precautions in other areas,
such as cybersecurity. Researchers have found a small but significant negative effect on the stock price of firms that suffer a
375
data breach. Second, if successful, these efforts can begin to
drive industry expectations and norms. Those norms not only
have soft power, they may be translated into pecuniary terms if
investors such as socially-responsible mutual funds incorporate
them into purchasing decisions. Soft power alone should not be
discounted. Google’s decision to begin its Transparency Reports
in 2010—which detail the number of requests such as copyright
376
takedown notices and demands to remove content, —led a
377
number of Internet firms to engage in the same disclosures. A
372. See John O’Neil & Eric Lichtblau, Qwest’s Refusal of N.S.A. Query Is
Explained, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/12/
washington/12cnd-phone.html.
373. See id.
374. See id. (discovering Qwest concluded that completing the requests for
the telephone records without a warrant would violate the privacy requirements of the Telecommunications Act).
375. See Edward A. Morse et al., Market Price Effects of Data Security
Breaches, 20 INFO. SEC. J. GLOBAL PERSP. 263, 271 (2011) (concluding that investors are influenced by data breaches); Alessandro Acquisti et al., Address
at the Twenty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems and
Workshop on the Economics of Information Security: Is There a Cost to Privacy Breaches? An Event Study (2006), http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/
papers/acquisti-friedman-telang-privacy-breaches.pdf.
376. See Transparency Report, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/trans
parencyreport (last visited Oct. 14, 2015); see Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E.
Bambauer, Vanished, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 137, 140–48 (2013).
377. See Ryan Budish, What Transparency Reports Don’t Tell Us, ATLANTIC
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norm of resistance can help ameliorate potential collective action problems with jawboningbut a company considering
whether to comply must consider the possibility that if it balks,
and competitors acquiesce, it will find itself a target for regulatory scrutiny.
The promise of reputational consequences is uncertain,
though, because there are two impediments to implementation.
Interested parties have to learn about jawboning attempts to
respond to them. At minimum, disclosure is not routine: the
Obama administration disclosed information about its pressures on ISPs to adopt Six Strikes only in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) lawsuit, and details about Project Goliath came to light as a result of the Sony hack (allegedly
related to the movie “The Interview”). Neither movie studio
cybersecurity breaches nor FoIA suits are the norm. Reputational sanctions can still operate in an environment of episodic
378
disclosure, but they are likely less effective.
In addition, the mechanisms for imposing consequences are
not perfectly understood. Stock divestment, social media campaigns, protests, critical media coverage, ratings by civil society
groupsall of these contribute, but not in a consistent or predictable fashion. And effects might be short-lived. For many data breaches, stock prices recover completely after only a
379
month. Using reputational penalties and rewards to counterbalance jawboning is an appealing concept, but one difficult to
translate precisely into practice.
(Dec. 19, 2013) http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/12/what
-transparency-reports-dont-tell-us/282529 (noting that numerous companies
began reporting requests in hopes to gain customer trust); Who Has Your
Back?, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., [hereinafter E.F.F.] https://www.eff
.org/who-has-your-back-2014 (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) (listing firms and disclosures).
378. Cf. Jay J. Janney & Steve Gove, Reputation and Corporate Social Responsibility Aberrations, Trends, and Hypocrisy: Reactions to Firm Choices in
the Stock Option Backdating Scandal, 48 J. MGMT. STUD. 1562, 1562 (2011)
(finding that firms with enhanced reputations for Corporate Social Responsibility are protected from scandal revelations but are more harshly sanctioned).
379. See Eric Chemi, Investors Couldn’t Care Less About Data Breaches,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 23, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014
-05-23/why-investors-just-dont-care-about-data-breaches
(describing
how
TJMaxx stock recovered a few months after its data breach, JPMorgan Chase
stock recovered two weeks after its data breach and Adobe Systems stock did
not decrease after its data breach); Sebastien Gay, Strategic News Bundling
and Privacy Breach Disclosures 2 (June 25, 2015) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author) (explaining that Anthem stock was unaffected after one of
the largest privacy breaches in history).
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3. Transparency Encouragement
Encouraging Internet firms to be transparenteven imperfectly soabout jawboning efforts can usefully serve as a
380
disinfectant against those measures. There are both internal
and external mechanisms for transparency. Internal measures
rely upon platforms’ cooperation, but Internet firms have been
increasingly willing to disclose previously-concealed government enforcement efforts. The Electronic Frontier Foundation
listed twenty-six online firms that published transparency re381
382
ports in 2014 up from one, Google, four years earlier. Internet companies such as Google negotiated with the federal
government to report aggregate data about the number of Na383
tional Security Letters (NSL) that the firms receive on an
384
annual basis.
Similarly, some companies, concerned that they may be legally barred from revealing whether they have received a specific warrant for user data, have begun to employ “warrant ca385
naries.” A warrant canary is an inverse signal: it reports that
the target platform has not received a warrant, subpoena, or
386
NSL. When the canary disappears, users know the firm has

380. Justice Louis Brandeis famously stated that “[s]unlight is said to be
the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.” Justice
Louis D. Brandeis, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS LEGACY FUND FOR SOC. JUST., http://
www.brandeis.edu/legacyfund/bio.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
381. E.F.F., supra note 377.
382. See Budish, supra note 377.
383. See 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2012). See generally Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.
Supp. 2d 471, 478–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (describing Section 2709 and the ability
for firms to converse with the government to decide what is necessary to disclose), vacated and remanded sub nom. Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d Cir.
2006).
384. See Letter from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, to Colin
Stretch, Esquire, Facebook Corporate Officer, et al. (Jan. 27, 2014), http://
www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/366201412716018407143.pdf
(describing
Department of Justice requirements for transparency reporting); see Danielle
Walker, Tech Companies, Media Join Twitter’s Fight To Divulge NSL Info, SC
MAGAZINE (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.scmagazine.com/eff-representing
-internet-co-telecom-fighting-to-reveal-details-of-nsls/article/398949 (describing Twitter lawsuit to enable firm to disclose additional details about NSLs
received).
385. See Rebecca Wexler, Warrant Canaries and Disclosure by Design: The
Real Threat to National Security Letter Gag Orders, 124 YALE L.J. F. 158, 159
(2014), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/warrant-canaries-and-disclosure
-by-design; CANARY WATCH, https://www.canarywatch.org (last updated Oct.
13, 2015).
386. See Wexler, supra note 385.
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received at least one demand for information. Apple, for example, includes this language in its 2013 Transparency Report:
“Apple has never received an order under Section 215 of the
388
USA Patriot Act.” In its next Report, that language disappeared, replaced by this notice: “To date, Apple has not received
any orders for bulk data,” likely indicating that the company
389
has received a more focused demand. Other companies with
warrant canaries include SpiderOak, Tumblr, Pinterest,
390
VikingVPN, and Wickr. While transparency reports provide
more fine-grained detail than warrant canariesthey indicate
both what demands were made and how the platform respondedboth types of voluntary disclosures provide a model for how
391
firms could increase transparency regarding jawboning.
It is also possible to have external transparency measures
that do not depend upon firms’ cooperation. More extreme examples include the Sony Pictures hack and Edward Snowden’s
disclosures. Guardians of Peace, the group that claimed responsibility for hacking Sony, released a huge volume of internal company documents that revealed not only creative tensions over the movie “The Interview,” but also the inner
392
workings of Project Goliath and other private information.
Snowden’s release of classified NSA documents showed that
387. Id. at 169.
388. See Jeff John Roberts, Apple’s “Warrant Canary” Disappears, Suggesting New Patriot Act Demands, GIGAOM (Sept. 18, 2014), https://gigaom.com/
2014/09/18/apples-warrant-canary-disappears-suggesting-new-patriot-act
-demands.
389. Id. But see Iain Thomson, Apple’s Warrant Canary Riddle: Cock-up,
Conspiracy, or Anti-Google Point-Scoring, REGISTER (Sept. 20, 2014), http://
www.theregister.co.uk/2014/09/20/apples_warrant_canary_is_either_cockup_
conspiracy_or_the_antigoogle_selling_point.
390. See Jennifer DeTrani, Wickr Transparency Report (Download), WICKR
(Oct. 14, 2014), https://wickr.com/category/transparency-report; Greg
Kumparak, SpiderOak Implements a Warrant Canary, TECHCRUNCH (Aug.
14, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/08/14/spideroak-implements-a-warrant
-canary; Derek Zimmer, The VikingVPN Warrant Canary Is Alive!,
VIKINGVPN (Dec. 9, 2013), https://vikingvpn.com/blogs/transparency/the
-vikingvpn-warrant-canary-is-live.
391. See, e.g., Government Requests To Remove Content, GOOGLE, http://
www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government (last visited Oct.
14, 2015) (displaying graph of increasing government requests to Google to
remove content between 2010 and 2014). See generally Bambauer &
Bambauer, supra note 376.
392. See Russell Brandom, Everything You Need To Know About the Sony
Hacks, VERGE (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.theverge.com/2014/12/18/7415735/
everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-sony-hacks/in (discussing the emails
revealing infighting over pre-production of the movie and anti-piracy efforts).
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Microsoft voluntarily aided the NSA in decrypting information
sent via the company’s Skype, Hotmail, and Outlook Web chat
393
services. Less glamorously, Comcast user Robb Topolski was
able to verify that his ISP was not complying with the FCC’s
jawboning over net neutrality: by running a packet sniffer, he
394
confirmed that Comcast was throttling BitTorrent. Similarly,
users could monitor Google’s search resultsif sites known to
infringe copyrighted materials suddenly vanished, they could
infer that the company had decided to comply with pressures
395
from state or federal government officials. At a more abstract
level, civil society groups could encourage transparency by tabulating and rating the measures firms take to reveal measures
396
such as jawboning.
Whether internal or external, transparency measures are
valuable to constraining jawboning. Users, consumers, and civil
society organizations should encourage transparency by firms,
both as a virtue in itself and as an input into other mechanisms
for checking the practice.
4. Normative Labeling
The last possibility is entirely suasive; definitively delineating jawboning as illegitimate can decrease its use. This option provides platforms with rhetorical covercalling out the
393. See Microsoft Helped the NSA Bypass Encryption, New Snowden Leak
Reveals, RT (July 12, 2013), http://rt.com/usa/microsoft-nsa-snowden-leak-971;
Ryan W. Neal, Snowden Reveals Microsoft PRISM Cooperation: Helped NSA
Decrypt Emails, Chats, Skype Conversations, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 11, 2013),
http://www.ibtimes.com/snowden-reveals-microsoft-prism-cooperation-helped
-nsa-decrypt-emails-chats-skype-conversations.
394. See Eckersley et al., supra note 204.
395. For example, Google began removing sites containing certain personal
information under the European Union’s “right to be forgotten” ruling. Sam
Schechner, Google Starts Removing Search Results Under Europe’s “Right To
Be Forgotten,” WALL ST. J. (June 26, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/google
-starts-removing-search-results-under-europes-right-to-be-forgotten-14037740
23; see Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion. One developer, Afiq Tariq, began a project that tracks every site removed. About Us, HIDDEN FROM GOOGLE, http://hiddenfromgoogle.afaqtariq.com/ #aboutus (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) (including thirty censored links affected by the “Right to be
Forgotten”); see Charlie Osborne, “Hidden from Google” Tracks Sites Removed
from Internet Searches, CNET NEWS (July 16, 2014), http://www.cnet.com/
news/hidden-from-google-tracks-sites-removed-from-internet-searches
(describing the website Afiq Tariq created).
396. See, e.g., E.F.F., supra note 377; Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note
258, at 418–40.
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government as “jawboning” has the same effect as accusing the
government of “censorship.” Painting government efforts as unlawful or simply normatively wrong can have considerable
power. Attorney General Hood backed off his efforts to pressure
Google once his jawboning came to light. Labeling sets the
terms of the debate. It leverages framing by forcing the government to explain why it is not engaging in illegitimate behavior, rather than a legitimate practice.
Framing’s power was first documented by cognitive psy397
chologists, and entered popular discourse in the U.S. after
politicians latched onto work by cognitive linguist George
398
Lakoff. The concept is that how an idea is describedin particular, the metaphors usedis critical to whether people favor
399
it. Language matters: consumers much prefer the kiwi to the
400
Chinese gooseberry, though they are precisely the same fruit.
In the Internet space, examples of framing are legion. Views of
Edward Snowden, for example, depend on whether one uses the
401
label “whistleblower” or “traitor” whether he is a patriot or
402
a terrorist.
The most cogent example for platforms and jawboning was
the debate over the Stop Online Piracy and PROTECT IP Acts.
At a technical level, arguments over the bills involved questions such as whether the proposed measures would undermine

397. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis
of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 287 (1979); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,
211 SCIENCE 453, 458 (1981).
398. GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT! KNOW YOUR VALUES
AND FRAME THE DEBATE (2004); see Matt Bai, The Framing Wars, N.Y. TIMES
(July 17, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/17/magazine/17DEMOCR
ATS.html.
399. See Bai, supra note 398.
400. See Chinese Gooseberry Becomes Kiwifruit, NEW ZEALAND HISTORY,
http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/the-chinese-gooseberry-becomes-the-kiwifruit
(last updated May 29, 2015). Ditto dried plums, which were originally called
“prunes.” See Lisa Zwirn, The Fruit Formerly Known as Prune Gets a Name
Change and a Makeover, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 10, 2001, at E3 (explaining that
prune producers believed the name change would increase prune sales).
401. See Tal Kopan, Poll: Edward Snowden Still a “Whistleblower,” POLITICO (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/edward-snowden-nsa
-leak-poll-95054.html (finding that 55% of Americans surveyed believed
Snowden to be a whistleblower).
402. See Sarah Dutton et al., Poll: Most Think Edward Snowden Should
Stand Trial in U.S., CBS NEWS (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/poll-most-think-edward-snowden-should-stand-trial-in-us.

2015]

AGAINST JAWBONING

115

403

security of the Domain Name System. At a semantic level,
the question was one of framing: would the bills be seen as preventing piracy, or promoting censorship? Both sides employed
metaphors that could be outcome-determinative. Who could defend pirating American intellectual property, or suppressing
free speech? And both had semantically-loaded terms at their
disposal: piracy or censorship. Indeed, the metaphors were embedded in the titles of the bills: piracy (SOPA), and theft of intellectual property (PROTECT IP). Advocates struck the same
notes repeatedly in the political discourse. The president of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce stated, “[w]ebsites that blatantly
steal the creativity and innovation of American industries vio404
late a fundamental right to property.” A Disney Research associate characterized the bills as about “protecting intellectual
property,” arguing that “[i]f blocking unauthorized access to a
work of art that is available ubiquitously through legal channels is censorship, then we need a new definition of censor405
ship.” And Senator Patrick Leahy, sponsor of PROTECT IP,
commented, “Protecting foreign criminals from liability rather
than protecting American copyright holders and intellectual
property developers is irresponsible, will cost American jobs,
406
and is just wrong.”
By contrast, supporters such as Google chairman Eric
Schmidt characterized the bills as “draconian . . . [since they]
would require [ISPs] to remove URLs from the web, which is
407
also known as censorship last time I checked.” Tumblr argued
that the legislation would “establish[] a censorship system us403. See Analysis of SOPA’s Impact on DNS and DNSSEC, ACM U.S.
PUBLIC POLICY COUNCIL, http://usacm.acm.org/images/documents/DNSD
NSSEC.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2015); Letter from Dr. Leonard M. Napolitano, Jr., to Rep. Zoe Lufgren, (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.scribd.com/doc/
73106069/Napolitano-Response-Rep-Lofgren-11-16-11-c.
404. Michail Vafeiadis, Five Major SOPA Supporters, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Elections/2012/0119/Five
-major-SOPA-supporters/U.S-Chamber-of-Commerce (quoting Thomas J. Donahue).
405. Anthony Accardo, Is Copyright Enforcement Censorship?, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Sept. 23, 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/09/is-copyright-enforcement-censo.
406. Sen. Patrick Leahy, Comment of Senator Patrick Leahy on the PROTECT IP Act, PATRICK LEAHY (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.leahy.senate.gov/
press/comment-of-senator-patrick-leahy-on-the-protect-ip-act.
407. Michael Sheridan, SOPA (Stop Internet Piracy Act) Is “Internet Censorship,” Says Google & Twitter & Facebook, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 17,
2011),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/sopa-internet-censorship
-google-twitter-facebook-article-1.979020.
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ing the same domain blacklisting technologies pioneered by
408
China and Iran.” And Wikipedia co-founder Jimmy Wales described the bills as “outrageous . . . just not acceptable under
409
the First Amendment.” SOPA and PROTECT IP lost in part
410
because the censorship frame won. Protecting intellectual
property was too indirectly connected with blocking Web sites
to gain sway, and safeguarding free speech by preventing censorship is deeply rooted in American mores and constitutional
history.
The goal of the normative labeling approach is to make
jawboning viscerally undesirableto conjure the same intellectual and emotional reactions that the term “censorship” arouses. It seeks to make jawboning not only a description of a type
of government enforcement, but also an inherent condemnation
of the practice. Put simply, saying that an official engaged in
jawboning ought to unsettle and offend that person. This plainly involves a change that will require effort. Jawboning is largely a neutral term at present. Wikipedia considers the word syn411
onymous with “moral suasion,” and in business, it routinely
connotes an “attempt to persuade others to act in a certain way
412
by using the influence or pressure of a high office.” Thus,
jawboning does not currently carry the cognitive payload needed to implement this proposal.
But, there is hopehackers have pointed the way. Originally, the term “hacker” was semantically neutral. It denoted
someone with technical skill and curiosity, who enjoyed tinker413
ing, especially with computers. Over time, though, as some of
408. Matt Peckham, SOPA Won’t Stop Online Piracy, Would Censor Everyone Else, TIME (Nov. 17, 2011), http://techland.time.com/2011/11/17/sopa-wont
-stop-online-piracy-would-censor-everyone-else.
409. Amy Goodman & Juan González, SOPA: Anti-Piracy or Censorship?
Wikipedia’s Jimmy Wales vs. Copyright Alliance’s Sandra Aistars, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Jan. 19, 2012) (quoting Jimmy Wales), http://www.democracynow
.org/2012/1/19/sopa_anti_piracy_or_censorship_wikipedias.
410. See Lemley et al., supra note 5.
411. Jawboning, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jawboning (last
visited Oct. 14, 2015).
http://www.allbusiness.com/barrons_
412. Jawboning,
ALLBUSINESS
dictionary/dictionary-jawboning-4943007-1.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
But see Thomas G. Donlan, The Cudgel of Samson: How the Government Once
Used “Jawboning” To Fight Inflation, BARRON’S (Mar. 24, 2008), http://www
.barrons.com/articles/SB120614228496656237 (describing “jawboning” as the
“government wagging a finger at business and labor to act with restraint,
while government acts without restraint” which was ineffective).
413. See Ben Yagoda, A Short History of “Hack,” NEW YORKER (Mar. 6,
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those clever tinkerers put their skills to socially harmful purposes, popular usage of the term embedded a connotation of de414
structiveness and malice. The technical community prefers
the term “cracker” for this purpose, or to distinguish between
white hat and black hat hackers, but their distinctions have
415
come to no avail in the wider discourse. The evolution of
“hacker” serves as a model for how we should use “jawboning.”
There are likely three keys to instantiating this approach.
First, proponents of the idea should use the term to describe
only illegitimate informal enforcementand, especially, egregious instances of it. Second, partisans should be attuned to the
416
media’s need for shorthand metaphors. This need is more potent than ever with hashtags and 140-character limits for
Tweets. Lastly, it helps that there is no group that is particularly invested in maintaining the current semiotic value of the
word. As with creating reputational consequences, there is no
single or predictable formula for shifting the meaning of jawboning. But the Internet ecosystem of blogs, Twitter, Facebook,
and Snapchat means that memes spread quickly. And, the
change is likely to appeal to political groupings at either end of
the American political spectrum: liberals concerned about the
tight relationship between corporations and government, and
libertarians worried about overweening state regulation.
The final step for this proposal takes place both during and
after the semiotic shift: the term “jawboning” can be used as a
weapon. Describing an informal government effort as jawboning will be implicitly to label it as extortion, or blackmail. This
can both drive public perception of the move and, if the government takes issue with the characterization, further reinforce the term’s new meaning. Americans tend to be inherently
skeptical of government, both as a structural matter (given the
Constitution’s limits on state power) and as a descriptive one
(public trust in government has fallen dramatically since the
417
Watergate scandal). As with censorship, deploying the term
2014), http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/a-short-history-of-hack.
414. See Derek E. Bambauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY
L.J. 1051, 1098–99 (2011).
415. See Chad Perrin, Hacker vs. Cracker, TECHREPUBLIC (Apr. 17, 2009,
6:20 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/it-security/hacker-vs-cracker.
416. See generally Jon M. Garon, Mortgaging the Meme: Financing and
Managing Disruptive Innovation, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 441, 463–
67 (2012).
417. See Public Trust in Government: 1958–2014, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
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jawboning as deprecation can be a potent means for limiting
the practice.
CONCLUSION
This Article concludes with observations about how the Article’s anti-jawboning position might extend beyond the First
Amendment doctrinally, and apply to new situations theoretically.
A. EXTENDING DOCTRINALLY
The skepticism of jawboning defended in this Article is
418
likely generalizable. Free speech concerns, such as pressures
on Internet platforms, are a particularly robust test case for the
Article’s claims: given constitutional and normative constraints
on government restrictions on expression, if the core antijawboning claims fail here, they likely fail everywhere. While
evaluating jawboning in different contexts must be left to future work, this Article suggests briefly that there are other areas where suspicion of the practice is likely to be sustained.
419
One promising candidate is guns. The Second Amendment, particularly as shaped by the Roberts Court, operates as
a potent barrier to governments’ regulation of firearms. Bans
420
421
on home ownership of firearms, retail sales in urban areas,
(Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/11/13/public-trust-in-govern
ment (reflecting a general decline in public trust in government beginning in
the mid-1970s).
418. The critique of jawboning may have particular salience for rapidly
changing or developing technologies beyond the Internet. See, e.g., Maxwell
Mensinger, Note, Remodeling “Model Aircraft”: Why Restrictive Language that
Grounded the Unmanned Industry Should Cease To Govern It, 100 MINN. L.
REV. 405, 420–39 (2015).
419. See generally Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989); L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words, and Constitutional Interpretation, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1311 (1997); Attorney General Patrick Morrisey Leads 21 States in Amicus Brief Supporting Citizens’ Second
Amendment Right to Own Guns, OFFICE OF THE WEST VIRGINIA ATTORNEY
GENERAL (Nov. 18, 2014) http://ago.wv.gov/pressroom/2014/Pages/Attorney
-General-Patrick-Morrisey-Leads-21-States-In-Amicus-Brief-Supporting
-Citizens’-Second-Amendment-Right-To-Own-Guns.aspx (“[Maryland’s] broad
categorical ban is no different than trying to impose a content-based ban on
speech.”). But see Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth To Firepower: How
the First Amendment Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 53–59 (2012)
(arguing that the differences between First and Second Amendment rights will
inhibit judicial protection of gun ownership).
420. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
421. See Ill. Ass’n of Firearms Dealers v. City of Chicago, 961 F. Supp. 2d
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423

public carry, and handgun possession have been struck
424
down in recent years, and the Fourteenth Amendment has
provided a vehicle for challenging state and local regulations in
addition to federal ones. Like the First Amendment, the Second
is not an absolute right, but both provide strong individual entitlements (to speak, or to possess and carry firearms) and the
government must offer strong justification before it can invade
425
them.
In addition to courts blocking existing firearms regulations, Congress has rejected proposals for additional restrictions at the federal level. In the wake of the massacre of
students and teachers at Sandy Hook Elementary School in
Newtown, Connecticut, on December 14, 2012, President
426
Obama vowed to seek new federal gun control legislation. Bipartisan legislation to expand background checks for gun buyers failed in the Senate, though, as it was unable to obtain a fil427
ibuster-proof sixty votes, winning only 5446. On the whole,
the past several decades have been ones of retrenchment for
gun control efforts: restrictions on firearms have been rolled
428
back consistently at both the federal and state levels.
Here, too, courts and the political branches have circumscribed firearm regulation, causing state actors to move increasingly to jawboning to achieve their ends. Consider guns
and banking. The Department of Justice launched Operation
Choke Point to pressure financial institutions to reduce lending
429
and payment processing services to fraudulent enterprises.
928 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
422. See Palmer v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 3d 173 (D.D.C. 2014).
423. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
424. See id.
425. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35 (linking First and Second Amendment
constitutional analysis).
426. See Alex Altman, Obama Takes a First Step on Gun Control After
Sandy Hook, TIME (Dec. 19, 2012), http://swampland.time.com/2012/12/19/
obama-takes-a-first-step-on-gun-control-after-sandy-hook.
427. See Jeff Zeleny et al., Obama Takes Senate To Task for Failed Gun
Control Measure, ABC NEWS (Apr. 17, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
obama-takes-senate-task-failed-gun-control-measure/story?id=18981374.
428. See Kristin Goss, Two Years After Sandy Hook, the Gun Control
Movement Has New Energy, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/16/two-years-after-sandy
-hook-the-gun-control-movement-has-new-energy.
429. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Justice Department Inquiry Takes Aim
at Banks’ Business with Payday Lenders, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2014, 9:59 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/justice-dept-inquiry-takes-aim-at
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Cutting off services to dodgy online payday lenders proved popular, drawing an endorsement from the editorial board of the
430
New York Times. But the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which regulates certain financial institutions and
insures deposits at them, went a step further. It circulated to
its members a list of high-risk businesses that posed “elevated . . . legal, reputational, and compliance risks” to their insti431
tutions. Along with payday lending, the letter targeted “por432
nography [and] online tobacco or firearms sales.” An earlier
iteration of the guidance posted by the FDIC to its Web site
listed firearms sales and ammunition sales as “merchant categories that have been associated with high-risk activity,” along
with “Racist Materials,” “Drug Paraphernalia,” and “Get Rich
433
Products.” Gun dealers were plainly in the FDIC’s sights.
Unsurprisingly, the regulators’ guidance generated results.
Banks have withdrawn service from gun dealers that are exist434
ing customers, and denied others the ability to open accounts.
For example, a Wisconsin gun store owner recorded his conversation with a bank manager after the credit union closed his
435
account. Heritage Credit Union (HCU) employees told Mike
Schuetz, the owner of Hawkins Guns, that “they do not service
436
companies that deal in guns.” A regional manager for HCU
elaborated that when examiners from the National Credit Union Administration audited the credit agency, they identified
-banks-business-with-payday-lenders.
430. See Editorial, “Operation Choke Point” Hits the Mark, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/11/opinion/operation-choke
-point-hits-the-mark.html.
431. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FINANCIAL INSTITUTION LETTERS, PAYMENT
PROCESSOR RELATIONSHIPS REVISED GUIDANCE (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www
.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2012/fil12003.html.
432. Id.
433. Managing Risks in Third Party Payment Processor Relationships, FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP. [hereinafter FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., Managing Risks]
(June 21, 2011) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review).
434. See Mike Tobin, DOJ Accused of Blocking Legal Gun Shops, Other
Businesses from Banking, FOX NEWS (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.foxnews
.com/politics/2015/01/16/doj-accused-blocking-legal-gun-shops-other-businesses
-from-banking.
435. See Hawkins Guns Targeted by Operation Choke Point, U.S. CONSUMER COALITION, http://usconsumers.org/hawkinsguns (last visited Oct. 14, 2015)
(providing recordings by Hawkins Guns owner).
436. Chuck Ross, Audio Tapes Reveal How Federal Regulators Shut Down
Gun Store Owner’s Bank Accounts, DAILY CALLER (Jan. 14, 2015, 2:51 PM),
http://dailycaller.com/2015/01/14/audio-tapes-reveal-how-federal-regulators
-shut-down-gun-store-owners-bank-accounts.
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Hawkins Guns’ account, among others, as “some accounts that
437
we feel that we’re going to regulate you on.” While the number of firearms dealers affected is not known, there are numerous reports of similar experiences: existing customers dropped
because they operated “high-risk” or “prohibitive business
438
type[s].” Jawboning banks over guns worked.
The federal government’s theory regarding its authority to
designate certain sectors as highly risky for banks’ reputations
is convoluted at best. The FDIC has considerable regulatory
authority over banks since the agency insures consumers’ deposits. Among other powers, the FDIC is authorized to police
unfair or deceptive trade practices under Section 5 of the Fed439
eral Trade Commission Act. And, Section 8 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act permits the FDIC to terminate an insured depository institution’s status if the entity is in an unsafe
440
or unsound condition to continue operations. The FDIC frequently issues informal guidance to depository institutions, including regarding risk to their reputations that could damage
441
their business. In considering the risks that may be created
via bank relationships with third parties, the FDIC includes
reputation risk, which it defines as “the risk arising from nega442
tive public opinion.” Significantly, reputation risk can result
from “[a]ny negative publicity involving the third party, whether or not the publicity is related to the institution’s use of the
443
third party.” Thus, as an outgrowth of its mandate to ensure

437. Id.
438. See, e.g., Trevor Anderson, Owner Believes His Pawn Shop Was
Dropped by Bank for Selling Guns, GOUPSTATE (Aug. 9, 2014, 10:14 PM),
http://www.goupstate.com/article/20140809/articles/140809663; Kelly Riddell,
“High Risk” Label from Feds Puts Gun Sellers in Banks’ Crosshairs, Hurts
Business, WASH. TIMES (May 18, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2014/may/18/targeted-gun-sellers-say-high-risk-label-from-feds
(citing
examples and stating that thousands of gun shop owners are affected).
439. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., GUIDANCE ON UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES, FIL-57-2002 (May 30, 2002), https://
www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2002/fil0257.html.
440. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(2)(A)(ii)–(a)(3) (2012).
441. See, e.g., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT,
SECTION 5: UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES, COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL (2014), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/
7/VII-1.1.pdf; FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., THIRD PARTY RISK, COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL VII-4.2 (2014), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compl
iance/manual/7/VII-4.1.pdf (defining reputation risk).
442. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., THIRD PARTY RISK, supra note 441.
443. Id.
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that federally-insured depository institutions do not undertake
excessive risk, the FDIC has both established categories of risk
and then defined the substance of those categories.
Reputation risk is seemingly boundless: any entity that
suffers bad publicity and that does business with a depository
institution potentially creates legally actionable risk for that
bank. Lawyers who advise banks have taken notice; one attorney described the term as “a catch-all to challenge any banking
444
businesses that are disfavored.”
At minimum, the FDIC
failed to link the factors it identifies as indicating a high-risk
clientthe consumer’s unfamiliarity with the merchant, uncertain quality of goods or services, purchases by phone or Internet, and inability of the consumer to verify the identity or legit445
imacy of the sellerto firearms and ammunition sales. Thus,
the FDIC’s authority to designate arbitrarily particular lines of
business as high-risk is questionable at best.
The Obama administration doubled down on jawboning
banks with Operation Choke Point. Choke Point was designed
to investigate banks and payment processors that might be
446
knowingly transacting with businesses committing fraud.
Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), the Attorney General can issue subpoenas to investigate fraudulent activity that affects a
447
federally-insured financial institution. With Choke Point, the
administration used threats of subpoenas to pressure banks
that do business with gun dealers. However, it is unclear
whether activities by the bank itself can support an investigation under FIRREA. The Department of Justice’s theory hangs
upon a single district court case involving an alleged scheme by
bank employees to misrepresent the prices of standing instruc448
tion trading to customers. Related case law, such as that interpreting the relevant FIRREA language in other statutory
444. Peter Weinstock, Examiners’ Growing Misuse of “Reputation Risk,”
AM. BANKER (July 2, 2013), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/
examiners-growing-misuse-of-reputation-risk-1060329-1.html.
445. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., Managing Risks, supra note 433.
446. See Alan Zibel, DOJ: “Choke Point” Isn’t Targeting Legal Gun Dealers,
Payday Lenders, WALL ST. J. MONEYBEAT (July 15, 2014, 2:47 PM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/07/15/doj-operation-choke-point-isnt-targeting
-gun-dealers-payday-lenders.
447. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(c)(2), 1833a(g) (2012).
448. See United States v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d 438
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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449

provisions, is split on the point. A memo from the Director of
the Consumer Protection Branch to Assistant Attorney General
Stuart Delery noted the mixed precedent regarding the government’s position, but stated that the Department of Justice
would continue to rely on that single district court case to pur450
sue its investigations. Even if the Department’s theory is correct, its approach under Operation Choke Point extended the
logic by yet another step. The court case the Department cited
involved allegedly fraudulent activities by employees of the de451
pository institution. With Choke Point, the Department of
Justice threatened banks with liability merely for doing business with high-risk clients, apparently including gun firmsa
far more tenuous connection to wrongdoing, if in fact there was
452
any wrongdoing at all.
Put simply, the combination of the FDIC’s extension of its
supervisory role into designating certain types of business as
untouchable, and the extension of the Department of Justice’s
use of investigatory powers under FIRREA to attack not fraud,
but relationships with the high-risk clients designated by the
FDIC, put the government far afield from its statutory authority. Any one of these leaps might be permissible, but all of them
risk asking us to believe six impossible things before breakfast,
453
and may well constitute jawboning.
The doctrinal parallels between First and Second Amendment constraints upon regulation, and the recent informal
pressures on banks to achieve firearms policy goals, suggest
449. See United States v. Agne, 214 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2000).
450. Memorandum from Michael S. Blume, Dir., Consumer Prot. Branch,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Div.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Operation Choke Point: Six-Month Status Report 336–38
(Sept. 9, 2013), http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Appen
dix-1-of-2.pdf.
451. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 443.
452. A staff report for the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform made similar allegations. U.S. HOUSE OF
REPS., COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S “OPERATION CHOKE POINT”: ILLEGALLY CHOKING OFF LEGITIMATE
BUSINESSES? (May 29, 2014), http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2014/05/Staff-Report-Operation-Choke-Point1.pdf; see also Emily Miller, DOJ
Accused of Targeting Gun Industry with “Choke Point” Program, FOX NEWS
(June 2, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/06/02/holder-justice
-department-accused-gun-grab-with-choke-point-program.
453. Cf. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, ch. V, (2013),
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/12/12-h/12-h.htm (quoting the White Queen,
who said, “sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before
breakfast”).
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that this Article’s theoretical approach to jawboning has application beyond the Internet context.
B. MAPPING NEW JAWBONING TERRITORY
A core scholarly question for jawboning, and other legislative threats, is whether, and, if so, when, these tactics are permissible once a government finds itself in uncharted territory.
The example of jawboning about gun sales suggests a potential
path through the contentious debates in the literature on regulatory threatsone that I will develop in future work, but out454
line here. Put simply, the legitimacy of jawboning is likely to
vary inversely with the level of structural constraint upon governmental regulation. Where barriers to regulation are relatively strong, as with enumerated rights including the First
and Second Amendments, informal efforts are less likely to be
455
legitimate. Here, the Constitution deliberately hobbles government efforts. Even if jawboning evades judicial proscription,
we should regard it as normatively problematic. Where there
are intermediate barrierssuch as regulations that draw in456
termediate scrutiny, including sex-based classifications, or
457
perhaps the unconstitutional conditions doctrine informal
enforcement has some legitimate room to operate, though its
use still ought to create a strong presumption against its permissibility.
In zones where governmental intervention requires only
the most minimal substantiation under the rational basis test,
458
perhaps jawboning ought to be presumptively permissible.
Here, informal enforcement can save costs to both regulator
and regulated. The state could likely obtain authority with relative ease, and thus jawboning enables targets to comply more
454. This framework contrasts with how other scholars have approached
these questions. Tim Wu, for example, views the legitimacy of regulatory
threats as determined by whether an industry changes rapidly or slowly. Wu,
supra note 49. Others view them as either in, or out. This Article’s approach is
more nuanced.
455. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008).
456. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (applying intermediate scrutiny to male-only admission policy at state military college).
457. See Renée Lettow Lerner, Unconstitutional Conditions, Germaneness,
and Institutional Review Boards, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 775, 784–85 (2007)
(drawing analogy between analysis in unconstitutional conditions cases and
those involving sex-based distinctions).
458. See generally Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483
(1955); Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 257.
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easily, and government to effectuate its ends with fewer formalities. A key factor here is the capability and willingness of
courts to patrol for defects in the political process, such as capture or public choice problems, that indicate a likely asymmetry
between the government’s ability to obtain results informally
459
versus through rulemaking or legislative mechanisms. This is
no easy task, but it is one to which courts have historically been
attuned in their role as countermajoritarian check on the other
460
two branches.
There are important tensions beneath the surface of this
tentative schema. It is difficult to detect, for example, whether
a regulation that affects speech draws (or ought to draw) First
461
Amendment review. Legal scholarship sharply contests the
boundaries of speech protection, or eligibility, and while the
Supreme Court has moved in the direction of greater coverage,
462
it has not done so consistently. In both the intermediate and
light zones, deciding upon a methodology for how strong the
presumption for or against jawboning ought to be is challenging. Courts have struggled with conceptually similar undertakings when defining tests for the unconstitutional conditions
463
464
doctrine, substantive due process violations, or permissible
465
gender-based discrimination. And the approach may have
significant consequences (albeit only suasive ones) for wide466
467
spread practices such as plea bargains, police interrogation,

459. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938);
Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to Congress
to Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361, 363–65 (2008).
460. See Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 131–32 (1962). But see Jeremy Waldron, The
Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006) (criticizing judicial review as an illegitimate process for a democracy to protect rights).
461. See generally United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012);
Collins, supra note 304.
462. See generally Bambauer, supra note 44; Collins, supra note 304; Neil
M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 1149 (2005).
463. See supra notes 363–64.
464. See Bambauer & Massaro, supra note 257.
465. See Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyen v. INS and the Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to Gender Classifications: Theory, Practice, and Reality, 30
PEPP. L. REV. 185, 191–212 (2003).
466. See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101
YALE L.J. 1979 (1992).
467. See generally Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425 (1996).
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468

and unfair competition enforcement. It is also worth noting
that this methodology comes into play when the state is acting
at the edges of, or beyond, its authority to enforce or adjudicate.
In the mine run of cases, such as Securities and Exchange
469
Commission enforcement of securities laws, or much of crimi470
nal law prosecution, informal settlements will be both legitimate and desirable.
Nonetheless, this Part’s proposed framework performs at
least three valuable services. First, it offers a potential internal
metric for regulators trying to determine when to pressure
firms. When state actors are considering whether and how to
press against the edges of their authority, this approach can
guide them on when to employ formal rulemaking or adjudication, versus when to deploy informal measures. Second, it gives
non-state entitiessuch as civil society groups, scholars, and
regulatory targets themselvesa yardstick by which to evalu471
ate state action. It binds criticism to a methodology, which
can answer objections that disapprobation is ad hoc or born of
self-interest. Lastly, it draws attention to the distinction between law and mores. Not all permissible state actions are de472
fensible. This seems particularly true with regulation of information, whether by proscription, prescription, or persuasion.
This Article usefully unsettles assumptions about the legitimacy of informal pressures.
Jawboning of Internet intermediaries is increasingly common, and it operates beneath the notice of both courts and
commentators. That inattention is misguided. There are times
when we need to root for Goliath.

468. See generally FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602
(D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, No. 14-3514, 2015 WL 4998121 (3d Cir. Aug. 24, 2015); see
Solove & Hartzog, supra note 337.
469. See generally Joshua A. Naftalis, Note, “Wells Submissions” to the
SEC as Offers of Settlement under Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and Their
Protection from Third-Party Discovery, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1912 (2002).
470. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA
AND CHARGE BARGAINING: RESEARCH SUMMARY 1 (2011), https://www.bja.gov/
Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf (estimating 90–95% of
criminal cases settle).
471. See Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 258, at 386–87.
472. See generally Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, supra note 58.

